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ABSTRACT
Every year, firms make numerous announcements to recall products that are
deemed unsafe or defective. These recalls pose a significant threat to a firm’s brand
reputation. The strong, negative reactions of consumers and the media to the recalls
initiated by Toyota in 2010 show how fragile brands are in the wake of a recall. Firms
spend a great amount of resources on building strong brands and it is unclear how such
brands influence the firm’s decision to announce a recall and the consumer’s decision to
return the recalled product. The objective of this dissertation is to shed some light on
these subjects through two essays. The first essay focuses on the role of brands on the
firm’s recall timing decision whereas the second essay focuses on the role of brands on
the consumer’s product return decision. The findings from both studies have important
implications for managers and policy makers regarding the management of product
recalls.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Whether it is a toy containing lead paint, a car with malfunctioning brakes, or
meat contaminated with E.coli, defective products pose a hazard to consumers’ health
and property. Recalls of defective products mitigate these dangers and reduce the
economic burden of injuries and deaths associated with their consumption. Recent high
profile recalls, such as those of Mattel toys (2007), Peanut Corporation of America’s
peanut butter (2008), and Toyota cars (2010), demonstrate how frequently recalls occur
(Table 1.1 shows the number of recalls for different product categories in the past
decade). Even though there is some variation of the number of recalls across years, the
overall trend points to an increase in the frequency of recalls. Given the increasing
complexity of organizations, stakeholder awareness of firm actions, and stricter
regulation, it is likely that most firms will face product recalls in their lifetime (Berman
1999).
In this dissertation, I present two essays that examine salient aspects of product
recall that have not received much attention: recall delay and recall effectiveness from the
perspective of the brand being recalled.
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Table 1.1 Number of Recalls between 2001-20101
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Consumer
products
Vehicles
Medical
devicesa
FDA (Overall)b

342

387

280

354

397

471

472

563

465

427

451

434

526

600

562

490

587

684

492

648

NA

NA

878

1451 1331 1331 1217 2217 2220 2692

4563 5025 4627 4670 5338 4266 5585 5778 8065 9361
a

only Class I & II recalls, b Number of recalled products

1.1 MOTIVATION FOR DISSERTATION ESSAYS
Prior studies on product recalls have largely focused on the consequences of
product recall announcements on consumer attitudes and behavior (e.g., Siomkos and
Kurzbard 1994; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Klein and Dawar 2004; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and
Helsen 2008; Dawar and Lei 2009), associated product and financial market penalties
(e.g., Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Davidson and Worrell 1992; Chen, Ganesan, and Liu
2009; Van Heerde, Dekimpe, and Helsen 2007; Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe
2013), and organizational learning (Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Thirumalai and Sinha
2011; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). Even though many of these studies
investigate how a firm’s recall behavior influences the degree of reputational and
financial penalties, little is known about the drivers of a firm’s recall strategy. Especially,
with a few notable exceptions (Chen et al. 2009; Teratanavat, Salin, and Hooker 2005;
Hora, Bapuji, and Roth 2011), the timing of product recalls and the firm’s response to
reports of product safety issues have not received much attention. Prior research in
consumer and investor behavior shows that recall delay can determine reputational and
1

Sources: www.odi-nhtsa.gov, www.fda.gov, FDA Enforcement Story/Enforcement Statistics FY2001-FY2010, CPSC
Annual Performance Reports FY2001-2003, CPSC Performance and Accountability Reports FY2004-2010.
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financial losses (e.g., Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Chen et al.
2009). Therefore, it is important to understand how firms time recalls given the influence
of the recall strategy on losses associated with a recall. I investigate the timing of product
recall in the first essay.
As with recall delay, very few empirical studies address the effectiveness of
recalls in terms of recall completion - the degree to which products under recall are
brought in for repair or replacement. Recent studies using data from the automotive
industry show that recalls can reduce harm to consumers (Bae and Benitez-Silva 2010,
2011; Kalaignanam et al. 2013). However, for this to happen, it is important that the
response rate to the recall be high. The factors that influence recall response rates have
received some attention over the years (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994; Rupp and Taylor
2002; Murphy and Rubin 1988). Ineffective and long drawn out recalls mean that firms
have to invest resources to manage recalls and be under the supervision of governmental
agencies responsible for monitoring product recalls for a longer time. Ineffective recalls
also leave the firm open to liability issues.
In short, even though numerous studies have focused on product recalls, areas that
have received little attention are related to the management of unsafe products, namely
the timing of a product recall and the implementation of an effective recall. Next, I
provide more details on the specific focus of the dissertation.

1.2 FOCUS OF DISSERTATION
In this dissertation, I focus on the impact that brands have on recall delay and
effectiveness (Figure 1.1). Recall delay is the time taken to announce a recall once a
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product problem is suspected and an investigation is opened. Recall effectiveness refers
to the extent to which consumers respond to the recall by getting the products repaired or
replaced. It has been well established that brands are assets and increase the chance of
long-term survival of the firm by accelerating and enhancing cash flows, reducing their
variability and vulnerability, and enhance the residual value of the firm (Srivastava,
Shervani, and Fahey 1998). There are two aspects of brands that are particularly
interesting in the context of product recalls and the recall management process.

Figure 1.1 Overview of Essays

First, because brands are valuable assets (for an overview of studies refer to
Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009), managers have a vested interest in protecting the equity
of brands. Therefore, in the case of product recalls, managers should be interested in
minimizing the degree of damage to the brand. Since the likelihood of reputational
damage from a recall depends on recall strategy (Table 1.2), a brand’s reputation should
influence the speed with which firm’s announce a recall after a safety investigation is
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ordered by regulatory agencies. Therefore, the research question that the first dissertation
essay addresses is:
1. How do brands influence the firm’s responsiveness to product safety
investigations?
Second, brands can influence how consumers respond to recall information. Recall
effectiveness depends on whether consumers heed the recall announcement and get the
recalled product repaired or replaced. Consumer response to a recall, however, may be
influenced by the brand’s reputation. The reputation of a brand creates consumer
expectations about its performance, and depending on conditions, could lead to
consumers downplaying the negative information or giving it more attention (Table 1.2).
Therefore, brand reputation could shape consumer response to recalls. Consequently, the
research question for the second essay is:
2. How do brands influence the likelihood that consumers respond to a product
recall and return the recalled product?

1.3 BACKGROUND: PRODUCT RECALLS
A product recall is “any attempt to remedy or correct products that are defective
or hazardous or that do not comply with the agencies’ safety standards” (Tobin 1982, p.
278). Recalls can result in product harm crises - low probability events that affect a
specific firm (Toyota’s sudden acceleration issue) or a product category (Lead paint in
toys, contaminated peanut butter) and receive wide publicity (Dawar and Pillutla 2000).
However, not all recalls turn into a crisis situation. Given the frequency of recalls,
particularly in the medical device and automotive industry (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011),
not all recalls receive the same attention from stakeholders. Table 1.3 lists examples of
recalls within the past five years that have received much media attention.
5

Table 1.2 Studies on Brands (Reputation) and Product Recalls
Authors

Key variables

Findings

Rhee (2009)

Organizational
learning

Firms have the greatest motivation to learn from
recalls when the quality reputation of the recalled
brand is either high or low.

Rhee and Haunschild
(2006)

Market performance

The market share of a brand drops more after a
recall when the brand has a high quality reputation.

Cleeren, Dekimpe, and
Helsen (2008)

Purchase behavior

Brand loyalty increases the likelihood of a trial after
a product recall. This effect erodes over time.

Dawar and Pillutla
(2000)

Brand evaluations

Klein and Dawar (2004)

Brand evaluations
and purchase
intentions

Chen, Ganesan, and Liu
(2009)

Choice of recall
strategy

Siomkos and Kurzbard
(1994)

Brand evaluations
and purchase
intentions

Dawar and Lei (2009)

Perceived crisis
seriousness and brand
evaluations

Cleeren, van Heerde, and
Dekimpe (2013)

Market performance

Zhao, Zhao, and Helsen
(2011)

Market performance

Lei, Dawar, and GürhanCanli (2012)

Brand evaluations

Kalaignanam,
Kushwaha,and Eilert
(2013)

Organizational
learning

Brands with strong expectations are less likely to be
affected by a recall than other brands. Depending
on the response strategy implemented, the firm can
reduce the likelihood of reputational losses.
Firm’s perceptions of corporate social
responsibility efforts reduce the likelihood that the
manufacturer is blamed for the crisis which, in turn,
reduces the likelihood that the recalled brand is
adversely affected.
A high reputation of the firm reduces the likelihood
that the firm chooses a proactive recall strategy. A
proactive recall is a recall occurring before any
product incidents are reported in the marketplace.
Consumers perceive the product defect to be less
dangerous when the recall involves a firm that they
are familiar with. They also show higher purchase
intentions after a recall for brands of a high
reputation firm.
The authors find no differences in the extent to
which familiar and unfamiliar consumers perceive a
product-harm crisis to be serious. Both consumers
also lower their brand evaluations.
High loyalty brands experience a greater downturn
in performance than other brands.
Simulation suggests that recalls influence high
quality brands by reducing quality evaluations and
increasing product quality uncertainty.
Consumers blame a high equity brand less for a
crisis when others in the same industry experience
similar crises. When there is no information about
crisis similarity, consumers react less negative to a
recall for such a brand when low base-rate
information of crises is available.
Brands influence the extent to which organizations
learn after a recall. Specifically, organizations learn
less from recalls of high quality brands.
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Table 1.3 List of Recent Well-Publicized Product Recalls
Firm/Product

Year

Toyota / Cars

2010

Mattel / Toys

2007

Johnson & Johnson /
Drugs

2010

Maytag / Dishwashers

2010

Fisher-Price / Toys &
high chairs

2010

McDonald’s /
Promotional glasses

2010

Multiple / Eggs

2010

Sony / Batteries

2006/
2008

Peanut Corporation of
America / Peanuts

2009

Multiple / Roman
shades & roll-up
blinds

2009

Multiple / Drop side
cribs

2007

Problem
Toyota initiates three major recalls in late 2009 and early 2010
related to unintended acceleration and braking. The recalls
involved approximately 8.5 million cars.
Mattel recalls approximately 19 million toys that were
manufactured in China. Concerns revolve around lead paint for
some products, small magnets which could pose a choking
hazard for others.
J&J recalls over 225 million bottles of over-the-counter drugs
including well-known brands such as Tylenol, Benadryl, and
Motrin. The firm temporarily shuts down a factory operated by
McNeil which is associated with the quality problems in these
products.
Maytag recalls over 1.7 million dishwashers due to the
potential of electrical failure that can pose a fire hazard. The
firm received 12 reports of fires including one extensive
kitchen fire.
Fisher-Price recalls over 11 million tricycles, toys, and high
chairs after reports of injuries.
McDonald’s recalls 12 million Shrek promotional glasses as
the paint contains cadmium.
Wright Country Eggs and Hillandale Farm Eggs recall
approximately 550 million eggs due to salmonella.
Sony recalls approximately (over 9 million in 2006 batteries in
both 2006 and 2008. Consumers reported that batteries can
overheat and cause burns. The recall affected firms using Sony
batteries in their products, such as Dell, Apple, Panasonic,
Toshiba, Acer, and IBM.
Peanut Corporation of America recalls all peanuts and peanutcontaining products due to salmonella. Over 350 companies
consequently have to recall their products. PCA files for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy as a result of the recall.
The CPSC recalls over 50 million roman shades and roll-up
blinds due to a strangulation hazard. The agency has received
multiple reports of infant deaths and injuries. Numerous
retailers are involved in this recall.
Since 2007, over 11 million drop-side cribs have been recalled
due to suffocation and strangulation hazards. The CPSC
received reports of at least 32 infant deaths associated with this
type of cribs. In 2011, new industry standards were
implemented making it illegal to sell and re-sell drop-side
cribs.

7

Products are recalled because they pose a threat to consumers and their property.
The overall economic impact of defective products has been estimated to be $700 billion
a year (CPSC 2005). Based on data from the CPSC’s National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS), a statistically representative sample of hospitals, it has
been estimated that over 184,000 consumers were treated in emergency rooms regarding
injuries associated with toys and over 2.7 million were treated for injuries associated with
home furnishings and fixtures between October 2008 and September 20092. Hence,
consumers are injured by products every day and recalls occur when either the
government or the manufacturer decide that the product failures and associated injuries
are substantial enough to warrant remediation.
Reasons why products cause such damage are flaws in design or manufacturing
process, use of inferior materials, product tampering, contamination, unforeseen misuse
and failure to comply with safety standards (Berman 1999). Also, products are recalled
when new information regarding a product’s safety becomes available. Table 1.4
provides some examples of each of these factors and firms recalling products for that
reason.
Recalls can be initiated by the firm or a government agency. In the United States,
these agencies include the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) for consumer
products, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for automotive
products, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for drugs, cosmetics, and
medical devices. In recent years, most recalls are conducted voluntarily which means that
firms initiate a recall before one of the agencies has to step in and mandate a removal and

2

http://www.cpsc.gov//PageFiles/122060/2010rpt.pdf
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repair of a defective product. Regardless of the source of initiation, recalls are conducted
under the supervision of one of these agencies.
Table 1.4 Examples of Product Flaws Leading to Recalls
Firm / Product

Hazard

Nautilus / Home gym

Design flaw

Multiple / Cribs

Design flaw

Description
Recall of about 78,000 home gyms whose seat rail
can fall and injure consumers when not manually
latched.
The design and construction of drop-side cribs poses
the risk of entrapment and suffocation. As result,
numerous recalls were issued and the CPSC issued
new regulation on crib safety, making the sale or
resale of these cribs illegal.

DEWALT / Framing
nailers

Manufacturing flaw

Recall of about 9,000 framing nailers that have been
incorrectly assembled during production.

Simpson Dura-Vent /
Fireplace damper

Manufacturing flaw

Recall of about 500 fireplace dampers that were
assembled backwards and pose a risk of carbon
monoxide poisoning to the consumer.

Unilever / Food

Contamination

Recall of Slim-Fast® Ready-to-Drink products to
possible contamination with Bacillus cereus.

Kellogg / Food

Contamination

Recall of Eggo Waffles manufactured at an Atlanta
plant due to the possibility of contamination with
Listeria monocytogenes.

Kompan Inc /
BigToys Inc

Inferior materials

Recall of about 700 swing sets due to fall hazard as
the support system can crack and break.

Dynacraft / Bicycles

Inferior materials

Recall of 32,000 bicycles due to frame failure.

IKEA / Mattresses

Failure to comply with
safety standard

Recall of about 1,900 mattresses that violated
Federal Mattress Flammability Standards.

Bauer / Hockey sticks

Failure to comply with
safety standard

Recall of about 67,000 hockey sticks due to
violations of the Federal Lead Paint Standard.

Volkswagen / Car

Mislabeling

Recall of 256 hybrid vehicles with labels incorrectly
stating tire pressure.

Tri-Union Seafoods /
Food

Mislabeling

Recall due to mislabeling of chopped clams, which
can contain undeclared shrimp.
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Other Concepts Related to Product Recalls
There are several other concepts, such as product returns, service recovery, or
negative publicity that are related but in important ways different from product recalls.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 summarize key similarities and differences between product recalls
and related literature streams. The characteristics in which product recalls differ from
these concepts are:
•

Timing of the warning: During consumption vs. before consumption (Product
warning)

•

Timing of the product return: During consumption vs. before consumption (Product
returns) vs. after consumption (Product recovery)

•

Type of recovery efforts: Mostly preventive vs. reactive (Product/service recovery)

•

Scope of recovery efforts: All products that could fail vs. only products that fail
(Product/service recovery)

•

Amount of negative publicity: Varies depending on recall vs. high (Negative product
publicity/product crises)
Conclusion
The issue of recall management is of high importance to both managers and policy

makers as evidenced by recent examples of recalls that have received much attention (and
scrutiny) for not being implemented effectively. This dissertation provides some novel
insights into not only how recalls are managed but also the role that market-based assets
play in determining the responsiveness of both firms and consumers in this context. The
first novel insight is that brands influence the speed with which firms initiate recalls
despite (or even because of) the risk that a recall can pose to the high reputation of the
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brand being recalled. By speeding up their decision to initiate a recall of a brand with a
high quality reputation, firms may not only be able to prevent product-related accidents in
the marketplace but also limit the loss in brand equity by demonstrating the
responsiveness of the brand to safety problems. The second key insight of this
dissertation is that implementing an effective recall may be a challenge for high
reputation brands. Consumers may perceive a recall for such a brand less threatening,
lowering their responsiveness to the recall. The structure of this dissertation is as follows:
In the following chapter (2) I introduce my first essay on brand reputation and recall
delay. Chapter 3 deals with the second dissertation essay on brand reputation and
consumer responsiveness to a recall.

11

Table 1.5 Comparison of Product Recalls with Other Related Concepts
Concept

Service recovery

Smith, Bolton, and
Wagner (1999)
Kelley and Davis (1994)
Maxham and Netemeyer
(2002)

12
Product recovery

Product returns

Comparison with product recalls

Illustrative articles

Thierry et al. (1995)
Jayaraman, Patterson, and
Rolland (2003)
Fleischmann et al. (2000)

Petersen and Kumar
(2009)
Hess, Chu and Gerstner
(1996)
Bechwati and Siegal
(2005)

Similarities

Differences

Service recovery refers to any action “that an
organization takes in response to a service failure”
(Gronroos 1988). Examples of service failure are, for
instance, overbooked flights, poor service at
restaurants, or delayed trains. The efforts
implemented to mitigate the service failure are similar
to the ones investigated in a product recall context
(apology, explanation, refund etc.). Attribution theory
has been a popular framework in the product/service
failure and product recall literature to explain when
consumers blame the manufacturer for the failure
(Folkes 1984; Folkes and Kotsos 1986).

Even though many of the actions part of service recovery
efforts are also applicable in a product recall context, there are
some notable differences between these two concepts. Since
services are intangible and the experience is highly
individualized, each recovery effort is unique to the situation in
which the failure occurs. Also, services cannot be recalled as
there are consumed while being produced. Moreover, recovery
efforts can only occur after a consumer has experienced a
service failure whereas a product recall seeks to eliminate the
probability of product failure before it occurs to the majority of
consumers. Recalls are usually a consequence of product
failures but product failures in many cases do not lead to
product recalls.

Product recovery is concerned with moving a product
from the hands of the consumer back to the
manufacturer (reverse supply chain). The reverse
logistic systems that are key to product recovery play
an important role in product recalls where the
objective is to remove the recalled product from the
marketplace.

The scope of product recovery is broader than just the retrieval
of recalled products. According to Thierry et al. (1995), the
objective of product recovery management is to “recover as
much of the economic (and ecological) value as reasonable as
possible, thereby reducing the ultimate quantities of waste” (p.
114). Product recovery therefore includes the repair,
refurbishment, remanufacturing, and recycling of products. The
focus is on the logistics behind moving the product up the
supply chain as efficiently as possible and not as much on the
effective retrieval of the product.

The literature on product returns usually investigates
when consumers return a product within the scope of
the firm’s return policy. Product returns are related to
product recalls because they involve a post-purchase
interaction between the consumer and the firm in
which the consumer returns the product to the point of
purchase or manufacturer.

The type of product returns that this literature is concerned with
usually stems from the problem that in certain contexts
consumers are unable to see or try out the actual product (e.g.,
catalogs, online shopping). Therefore, the product returns under
investigation occur when consumers change their mind about a
purchase (Bechwati and Siegal 2005), whereas the product
return behavior that is the focus of the recall literature occurs
during product consumption after the consumer has made up
his or her mind about keeping the product.

Table 1.6 Comparison of Product Recalls with Other Related Concepts (continued)
Concept

Comparison with product recalls

Illustrative articles
Similarities

Product warnings

13
Negative product
publicity

Differences

Argo and Main (2004)

The two main objectives of warning labels are the
prevention of unsafe behaviors and promotion of
appropriate behaviors during the consumption of the
product (Wolgalter, Kalsher, and Racicot 1993, cf.
Argo and Main 2004). A recall announcement is a
warning for consumers regarding a product hazard
and it outlines actions the consumer can take to
eliminate the hazard.

Product warnings studied in prior literature are often known to
consumers at the time of purchase and occur in the form of
labels or manuals. Therefore, consumers are aware of the risks
of using the product when making the purchase and can
anticipate potential hazards (Griffin, Babin, and Attaway 1996)
whereas the information about the defect that leads to the recall
is distributed to consumers after the recall. Since it is difficult
in certain industries to locate all consumers of a particular
product, not everyone may receive the warning.

Monga and John (2008)
Ahluwalia, Burnkrant,
and Rao (2000)
Ahluwalia (2002)
Einwiller et al. (2006)
Dean (2004)
Pullig, Netemeyer, and
Biswas (2006)
Dutta and Pullig (2011)

Firms face the risk that product recalls garner media
attention and substantial negative publicity. Negative
publicity can have a long-term damaging impact on
the brand’s performance and even affect other
products in the firm’s portfolio (Sulllivan 1990).
Product recalls that are well publicized induce a crisis
situation for the firm (“product-harm crisis”) in which
the outward management of the recall becomes
extremely important to handle stakeholder concerns.
Factors that are likely to increase the likelihood of
negative publicity are the size of the recall, the
severity of the product hazard, and the recalled brand
(Rupp 2001; Rhee and Haunschild 2006).

The scope of the literature on negative product publicity is
broader in scope than the product recall literature, because it
includes events such as manufacturing problems, unethical
sourcing, human rights violations, and environmental
violations.

CHAPTER 2
RECALL NOW OR RECALL LATER: INVESTIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF BRAND
QUALITY REPUTATION ON TIME TO RECALL
Defective products cause financial loss to consumers and could even affect their
physical safety. Faulty products also expose manufacturers to liability claims, fines, and
loss of reputation. Consequently, defective products are often recalled to limit damage to
consumers and firms. Product recalls can be voluntary or mandated by regulatory
agencies, and are not rare events. For instance, in the United States, the Consumer
Products Safety Commission reported in their 2010 annual report that a total of 427
consumer products, ranging from dishwashers to toys and cribs, were recalled that year.
In the automobile industry the National Highway Transportation and Safety Agency
(NHTSA), since its inception in 1966, has overseen recalls involving hundreds of
millions of vehicles in the United States (Rupp and Taylor 2002).
When a product is suspected of defects, a government agency can start an
investigation. Firms respond to the investigation by voluntarily initiating a recall or
waiting to see the outcome. Recalls are costly; announcing and implementing a recall is
associated with both direct costs (communication, logistics, repair or refund), and indirect
costs (losses in both reputation and market performance, such as sales and market share).
For instance, Toyota’s sales in the U.S. dropped by 5.2% from 2009 to 2010 after the
firm issued several major recalls in the first half of the year (Toyota Annual Report
2010). Recalls can often have a devastating impact on a firm’s performance, sometimes
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even threatening its survival.3 Furthermore, many product defect investigations end with
the product being cleared of suspected defects. Thus, a firm has reasons to avoid a
proactive recall and instead wait for the investigation to conclude. However, delaying a
product recall may lead to higher direct and indirect costs through fines, liability costs,
and most importantly, diminished reputation (e.g., Maynard 2010). Hence, there are
benefits to having an early recall as well as delaying the recall once a product is
suspected of being defective and an investigation is launched.
Correspondingly, there is considerable variation in the time taken by firms to
announce recalls once a product is under investigation (Wieder 2011). The timing of a
product recall has implications for the firm and society alike. Though an early recall can
reduce harm to consumers, the firm will have to bear the costs associated with the recall
that it could potentially postpone or avoid. Therefore, the objective of this research is to
seek a better understanding of the factors that can help explain the time to recall a product
once a defect investigation is announced. I investigate why there is variation in the time
to recall once an investigation into a potential product defect has started. Time to recall is
defined as the time lag between the opening of an external, formal defect investigation
and the announcement of a recall by the firm.
Quite intuitively, time to recall is likely to be influenced by factors such as the
degree of harm caused by defective products or the firm’s resource position. I move
beyond these factors and examine the relationship between the reputation of the brand
that is under investigation and time to recall. Brands play a central role in negative events
3

As a result of the 2007 salmonella scare associated with peanuts, the Peanut Corp. filed for bankruptcy in
2009. It was estimated that the firm’s products affected over 600 people and resulted in more than 2000
related recalls of products using Peanut Corp’s peanuts.
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targeting the firm, such as product recalls. Firms spend a tremendous amount of resources
on building strong brands but the negativity of the recall information can be potentially
damaging to the brand. A study conducted by Ernst and Young4 suggests that brand
concerns rank only after safety concerns when firms announce recalls. Even though firms
are clearly concerned about their marketing assets when facing the prospect of a recall,
little is known about the influence of brands on the recall management process.
The current literature suggests two competing arguments. According to the first
stream of research, firms should speed up the recall when high equity brands are involved
because the recall constitutes negative information that violates marketplace expectations
(e.g., Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Hence, firms will be motivated to appear responsive in
order to reduce the disconfirmation of expectation and adverse impact of a recall on the
brand. The second stream of research would suggest that firms should delay the recall
when high equity brands are involved because they do not want to signal that something
is wrong with the brand. Also, evidence suggests that high equity brands can be, under
certain circumstances, “immune” to negative publicity and the firm can therefore afford
to wait longer in order to make a better-informed recall decision (e.g., Dawar and Pillutla
2000). Thus, the questions that I am seeking out to answer are: How do brands that have a
high reputation for being reliable influence the firm’s decision to time a recall? Will firms
announce a recall faster? If so, are there conditions under which firms will try to delay a
recall for a high equity brand?
From the time the investigation is launched, stakeholders can observe the
behavior of the firm. Because information about the investigation and the responsiveness

4

http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Capturing_Recall_Costs/$FILE/Capturing_recall_costs.pdf
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of the firm is public, firms may exhibit different behavior to protect their brands. In my
study, I show that both arguments are valid and that there are instances in which firms
will speed up a recall for a high equity brand and others in which firms will be more
inclined to wait. Namely, firms will announce a recall faster when a brand is of high
reliability and a recall could result in strong negative reactions from consumers and other
stakeholders. Still, they will only do so if they anticipate damage to the positive
associations that consumers have about the brand and related losses to performance.
Hence, I not only extend the currently evolving literature on recall timing but also
integrate the two arguments that are currently present in the brand management literature
on how brands fare in the wake of negative publicity.
I specifically examine whether brand quality reputation (hereafter, brand
reputation in this paper), a brand’s status as a provider of reliable products, influences
time to recall. I further assess whether other brand characteristics – brand importance and
brand diversification – influence the relationship between brand reputation and time to
recall. Brand importance is defined in this study as the significance of the brand to the
firm’s revenues, while brand diversification reflects the number and variety of the
products that are marketed under its umbrella.
My basic premise is that when a brand is investigated for defects, the potential
impact of time to recall on the brand’s reputation influences recall behavior. For a brand
of high reputation, information about product defects runs contrary to consumer
expectations, implying a possible downgrade of consumer assessment of the brand’s
quality (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). In such circumstances, an early recall might limit
the damage to the brand’s reputation because the action is consistent with consumer
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expectations from a high quality brand and can signal the firm’s concern with providing a
high quality product. The degree to which such a downgrading influences the firm’s
performance depends on how important the brand is to the firm’s performance in the
market. Therefore, when a high reputation brand is of high importance, the recall is likely
to be announced even faster (Figure 2.1). For brands of high reputation that are highly
diversified, information about product defects may not result in consumers updating their
overall perceptions of the brand. This is due to the confidence that consumers have in the
brand’s quality given that there is more information available about the brand’s ability to
produce high quality products in multiple categories. In this instance, the firm may take
longer to announce a recall for a brand of high reputation because a delay in recall is less
likely to lead to downgrading of the brand’s reputation compared to a more focused brand
of strong reputation.

Brand characteristics
Diversification (H2)
Importance (H3)

Brand reputation (H1)

Time to Recall

Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework (Essay 1)
The study context is the U.S. automotive industry and the defect investigations
that involve all major automakers from 1999 to 2008. Specifically, I examine the time it
takes to announce a recall after an investigation into a potentially defective product is
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launched by the NHTSA. I analyze the data using a Tobit model in conjunction with a
Probit estimation of a selection model, as time to recall is observed only when the
investigation ends in a recall. In line with the predictions, the results show that a recall is
announced faster for a brand of high reputation. The level of diversification of a high
reputation brand delays the recall while its importance to the firm’s revenues accelerates
the recall. To isolate these effects, I control for other factors that might affect time to
recall, such as reports of product harm and the firm’s resource position.
The contributions of this manuscript are twofold. First, this study adds to the
brand management literature by investigating the impact of brands on an action that is
associated with negative consequences for the firm – announcing a product recall. The
focus on the firm’s motivation to protect a brand when it is faced with a potential crisis
helps answer questions about how brand considerations influence recall decisions. Prior
research has largely examined the impact of the firm’s response strategy on the
perceptions of the brand being recalled (e.g., Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Siomkos and
Kurzbard 1994). These studies do not account for the fact that firms select strategies that
are likely to limit the adverse impact of the recall on the brand in the first place. More
importantly, the contrasting findings from prior literature do not clearly indicate which
recall strategy ought to implement. I therefore examine multiple conditions under which
the firm’s response to a defect investigation for a high quality brand varies. Second, the
present study extends our knowledge of how firms manage product recalls. The product
recall literature stream has predominantly focused on the consequences of the recall for
the firm’s bottom line and reputation (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Van Heerde, Helsen,
and Dekimpe 2007; Klein and Dawar 2004; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Rhee and
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Haunschild 2006), while little attention has been paid to the actual recall behavior of the
firm5. Still, understanding recall behavior is important because product failures and
recalls have significant repercussions for the public’s safety and the firm’s going concern.
The timing of recalls cannot only influence legal consequences but also the losses that a
firm incurs as the result of the recall. This manuscript provides insights into the
competing pressures that managers face and the trade-offs involved when a brand is
under investigation for potential defects. Based on the contrasting findings from prior
literature it is unclear whether firms will speed up or delay a recall during an
investigation based on the type of brand involved. The results also enhance understanding
of how various brand-related criteria allow managers flexibility in terms of responses to
market-related problems.

2.1 BACKGROUND: PRODUCT RECALLS AND COSTS
Products are recalled when defects undermine their performance. Recalls are
offered to all consumers of a product, including those who have not experienced any
problem associated with the defect. To complete a recall, firms repair the product or
allow customers to return the product for a refund. Recalls are often supervised by
governmental agencies that, among other activities, inform the public about a recall and
monitor its completion. In the United States, these agencies include the Consumer

5

Notable exceptions are Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009) and Hora, Bapuji, and Roth (2011). Chen and
colleagues estimate a model to predict whether a firm’s recall is proactive (occurring before any product
incidences are reported) or reactive. However, the focus of their study is on the stock market response to
different recall strategies. Hora and colleagues (2011) investigate factors that influence the duration that a
product was on the market before being recalled. This present study differs from these two studies by
examining a firm’s response to defect investigations, hence measuring the timing of a recall decision after there
is reasonable suspicion of a product defect (i.e., due to the occurrence of product failures in the market). A key
point of distinction is the focus on characteristics of the brand that is part of the investigation.
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Product Safety Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, among others. These agencies also investigate product
defects, as their primary goal is to protect the public interest. For the firm, the opening of
such an investigation means that there is public acknowledgment that the product is being
investigated for potential defects.
Product recalls are often undertaken before the investigation has concluded. A
straightforward explanation for such an early recall is that there is enough evidence of
harm from the product that the firm decides to expedite what would be an inevitable
recall. However, I demonstrate that after these factors are accounted for, brand reputation
plays a role in determining recall timing. The underlying logic for the influence of brand
reputation on recall timing is that brands with stronger reputations bear a higher cost in
terms of damage to reputation if a recall is not handled expeditiously.
Direct and Indirect Recall Costs
Recall costs can be classified as either direct or indirect costs and are the reason
why firms incur financial losses when announcing a product recall. Direct costs include
all expenditures of managing the recall process - expenses for repair, refund, or
replacement, including costs associated with retrieving the defective product (Jayaraman,
Patterson, and Rolland 2003). The magnitude of these costs depends on the nature of the
problem, the type of remedy provided, the size of the product population to be recalled,
and the response rate to the product recall. Even though one can argue that lower costs
from a low response rate might motivate firms to implement an ineffective recall (i.e.,
reducing the response rate), there are certain threshold levels regarding the response rate
that firms have to achieve for a recall to avoid follow-up requirements imposed by the
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agency that supervises the recall (e.g., 65% after six recall quarters for automotive recalls,
U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011). Implementation costs also include those
related to communicating with various stakeholder groups throughout and after the recall.
This communication can include the dissemination of information about the product
defect and recall but also efforts targeted towards repairing the damage to the brand’s
reputation.
In addition to direct costs, recalls can also result in indirect costs associated with
declines in reputation and market performance. Brand reputation depends on the
perceptions that consumers have about the brand’s safety and quality (Keller 1993).
Therefore, brand reputation can be influenced by the information conveyed in a product
recall announcement. Recall announcement constitutes negative information about a
brand’s performance. Therefore, firms risk damage to the reputation of the brand that is
involved in a recall if consumers update their beliefs about the brand. Apart from the
damage to the reputation of a brand, recalls can lead to a downturn in the firm’s market
performance (Van Heerde et al. 2007; Rhee and Haunschild 2006). This decline can
occur for several reasons. Firms may withdraw a recalled product from the market
completely. For example, Johnson & Johnson withdrew numerous over-the-counter drugs
in 2010, including well-known brands such as Benadryl and Tylenol. Moreover,
consumers may be inclined to stay away from a product category entirely or switch, at
least temporarily, to competitive products.
Given that recalls impose substantial costs on a firm, it is not surprising that the
stock market tends to react negatively to a recall as shareholders seem to incorporate both
direct and indirect costs in their evaluation of the firm’s long-term prospects (Barber and
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Darrough 1996; Davidson and Worrell 1992; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Thomsen and
McKenzie 2001). Since not all recalls are likely to impose the same degree of direct and
indirect costs on the firm, the magnitude of the reaction from the stock market to a recall
announcement is influenced by recall and firm characteristics (Chen et al. 2009;
Thirumalai and Sinha 2011).
Recall Costs and Recall Timing
Recall costs can be influenced by the timing of a recall (Table 1). The seriousness
of the financial costs and losses in reputation that firms incur if they make the choice to
announce a recall increases a manager’s motivation to avoid a recall. Combined with the
fact that an investigation does not necessarily lead to a recall – about half of
investigations are closed by the NHTSA without a recall (Rupp and Taylor 2002; this
study) – managers have little incentive to announce a recall quickly and not to wait out
the investigation. Investigations can end without a recall because product-related
incidences in the marketplace can occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, though
some complaints about product failures can arise from a legitimate product defect (e.g.,
design flaw, production defect), others could be the result of misuse of a product or even
sabotage (Berman 1999). As a Ford spokesperson noted during an investigation into a
defect causing a fire hazard involving the Ford F-150 series: “Fires happen for a variety
of reasons from faulty repair, improper modification to the vehicle with aftermarket parts
and wiring, prior accident damage, and even arson. This is why each complaint or
allegation must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis” (Thomas 2005). Therefore, “a recall
made too soon could give credibility to an unsubstantiated claim” (Smith, Thomas, and
Quelch 1996, p. 106). In addition, the investigation could show that the product is safe,
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thus eliminating the need for a recall. If a recall does become necessary, the firm hopes to
save money by delaying the recall and pushing the direct costs of recall into future time
periods. In essence, considering the direct costs of a recall reduces the firm’s motivation
to announce a recall soon into an investigation.
However, announcing a recall long after an investigation was started might also
prove costly for a firm when considering the indirect costs of a recall. Indirect costs
associated with losses in the recalled brand’s reputation, in contrast to the direct costs of a
recall, are unlikely to be constant during the time period that the investigation is open.
That is, if a recall becomes inevitable, losses in reputation are likely to increase with the
delay in recall because consumers punish firms less by when they display responsive and
proactive recall behavior (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). That is, proactive response
strategies lead to lower losses in brand reputation than a stonewalling or defensive
response, especially if consumers expect the brand to act responsibly (Dawar and Pillutla
2000). Since the indirect costs of a recall can often exceed the direct costs of a recall
(Rupp 2004), firms could be more willing to implement a recall and face the direct costs
soon into a defect investigation if this means that reputation-related losses are minimized.
In summary, product recalls are costly endeavors and an expedited recall is
unlikely unless there are extenuating circumstances, such as potential loss to brandrelated assets if a recall is issued late rather than early. Before I develop hypotheses
regarding the brand characteristics that influence recall timing, some background on the
recall process in the automobile industry, the context of the study, is provided.
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Recalls in the Auto Industry in the United States
The NHTSA was created in response to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966.6 The NHTSA’s responsibilities include establishing minimum
performance standards for automobiles, verifying whether these standards are met,
investigating noncompliance, and directing recall campaigns if required (Rupp and
Taylor 2002). The NHTSA has overseen thousands of recalls involving hundreds of
millions of vehicles since its inception in 1966. Most of the recalls are voluntary as the
manufacturer agrees to carry out a recall supervised by the NHTSA. Once a product
defect is suspected, the NHTSA can open a preliminary investigation. This investigation
is closed if there is no violation of expected product safety standards. If further review is
required, NHTSA can escalate the investigation to engineering analysis. The average time
between the start of the initial investigation and escalation is 140 days. The engineering
analysis, the second stage, takes about a year to complete (Rupp and Taylor 2002). The
manufacturer can issue a recall at any stage of the investigation. Once a recall is
announced, manufacturers are given time to find an appropriate solution to the problem
and organize the recall. Hence, the recall announcement is unlikely to be delayed to
identify a solution or prepare for the recall.

6

(http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Traffic%20Injury%20Control/Articles/Associated%20Files/MVDefectsandRecall
.pdf).
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2.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Brand Reputation and Motivation to Recall Quickly
As noted previously, firms have incentives to wait and monitor the progress of the
investigation, although there are circumstances under which they might consider a quick
recall. I hypothesize that - other things remaining the same - a brand’s reputation
influences a firm’s decision to initiate a recall quickly instead of waiting out the defect
investigation process in the hope that a recall would not become necessary.
Generally speaking, brands derive their value from a variety of factors, such as
consumer awareness and attitudes such as desirability, perceptions of quality, and trust
(Keller 1993). In this study, I focus on brand associations pertaining to quality because of
its direct connection to product defects and recall. Reputation - whether for a brand or for
the firm itself - is a critical asset that firms strive to protect. For instance, Warren Buffet,
CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, in a July 2010 letter, exhorted his managers to zealously
guard Berkshire’s reputation: “We can afford to lose money – even a lot of money, but
we can’t afford to lose reputation – even a shred of reputation” (Protess, Rusli, and Craig
2011). A strong reputation for quality products or services confers several advantages on
a brand. It attracts and retains customers, reduces their price sensitivity, and enhances
revenues (Keller 1993).
Brand reputation may be harmed by a recall because consumers and other
stakeholders may react strongly to the negative information. A brand with a reputation for
being a provider of high quality products has an implicit contract with its customers
regarding the performance of the product. The higher the quality reputation, the more
likely it is that consumers expect the consumption of the product to be safe. Moreover,
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consumers of such brands are very sensitive to information that could violate these
expectations of high quality (Heath and Chatterjee 1995). A recall for a brand that has a
reputation for being reliable hurts the foundation of the consumer-brand relationship
which results in strong negative reactions on the side of the consumer (Aaker, Fournier,
and Brasel 2004). A recall for a high quality brand could therefore result in a downturn in
market performance (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Thus, brands with a high reputation
may suffer greater damage compared to those with a low reputation where a recall does
not disconfirm the expectations of consumers.
An alternative perspective proposes that a strong brand can withstand negative
information such as a product recall announcement as consumers resist counterattitudinal
information even when it targets core beliefs about the brand (Ahluwalia et al. 2000;
Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren et al. 2008; Pullig et al. 2006). However, these studies
find that this “buffering” effect tends to hold only for consumers who have a strong
relationship with the brand. Stakeholders, including shareholders and future consumers,
who do not share the same intense allegiance to the brand may use the recall information
to downgrade the reputation of the brand.
It is, however, possible to reduce the degree of disconfirmation and limit erosion
of reputation of the brand. Managers can influence the extent to which a recall
disconfirms consumer expectations about a high quality brand through the firm’s
response strategy to a product defect. Dawar and Pillutla’s (2000) findings suggest that
the losses in reputation that a firm faces in a recall are a function of prior expectations
and the firm’s recall strategy. A quick recall effort would be more consistent with the
expected response from a brand of high reputation than it would be for a brand of low
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reputation. Firms should thus be able to mitigate the disconfirming information about
product defects to some degree by issuing a recall quickly after a safety investigation is
issued. Therefore, I expect that firms initiate recalls faster when a brand of high
reputation is under investigation in order to protect the brand.
In summary, if the investigated brand has a high reputation for being reliable,
managers will perceive a sense of urgency of responding to the investigation quickly. The
option of waiting out the investigation becomes less attractive in light of the potential
losses in brand reputation and subsequent market performance. Brands that do not have
such a reputation will not increase a firm’s motivation to speed up the recall
announcement because consumers do not expect a fast response from these brands and
because the risk of losing brand equity is comparably low. Hence:
H1: Brand reputation has a negative effect on time to recall such that recalls are
announced sooner for brands of high reputation.
Moderating Influence of Brand Diversification
However, there may be instances in which a manager may not perceive a quick
response to reduce the degree of disconfirmation as important which will lead to a delay
in recall even for a brand of high reliability. Such a circumstance will occur when
managers do not expect consumers to react strongly to a recall even if it disconfirms their
expectations. I propose that the level of brand diversification provides a context for this
process to occur. Diversified brands sell a variety of products under the brand name.
Even though products under a diverse brand may be targeted at different market
segments, all are anchored around a shared reputation.
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First, diversification will increase confidence that consumers have in the
reliability of the brand’s products because they have more information to make an
assessment. People are more confident of their judgments based on a large sample of
instances than on a relatively small sample, and hence, diversification increases the
confidence that consumers have in their perceptions of the high quality brand (Dacin and
Smith 1994). The greater confidence that consumer have in the quality reputation of
diversified brands makes it more likely that they will not incorporate information about a
recall in their evaluations of the brand. Pullig et al. (2006) find that when consumers are
confident in their attitudes, they do not adjust their evaluations of a brand when negative,
performance-related information (i.e., information about a recall) targets a brand on a
performance (i.e., quality) positioning.
Second, diversification decreases the similarity between products marketed
underneath the same brand. Hence, the intra-portfolio relationships will be weaker for a
highly diversified brand than a less diversified brand. These weak bonds between brands
should limit the extent of intra-brand spillovers (Lei, Dawar, and Lemmink 2008) which,
in turn, decreases the overall risk associated with the (wrong) timing of a recall.
Therefore managers will be more likely to wait out the investigation because the benefits
of responding quickly are less pronounced as the diversification level of the high
reputation brand increases. Therefore, I propose:
H2: Brand diversification reduces the negative effect of brand reputation on time
to recall such that recalls are announced later for high reputation brands that
are more diversified.
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Moderating Influence of Brand Importance
A firm’s motivation to issue a fast response to a safety investigation should also
be influenced by whether any loss in the reputation of the brand under investigation has a
substantial impact on future firm performance. If a firm relies heavily on the sales of the
investigated brand for its overall performance in the market, it has more at stake when
brand expectations are violated. Since product defects affect the core of the brand’s
reputation for producing highly reliable products, an appropriate response that minimizes
the degree to which consumers’ update their beliefs about the brand becomes critical to
the firm’s survival when the brand is critically important to the firm.
In essence, when a brand has a high reputation for quality and also contributes
substantially to the firm’s performance by accounting for a large part of its sales, declines
in reputation can be catastrophic. As noted earlier, if the products are suspected to be
defective, high reputation brands are likely to be downgraded to a larger degree by
consumers than low reputation brands because of greater violation of expectations for the
former. When these high reputation brands are also of great significance to the firm’s
sales, the firm can ill afford the loss of reputation and consequent negative impact on
future revenues. For such brands, a quicker recall after a safety investigation is opened is
likely as an effort to limit the potential loss of reputation.
For a low reputation brand, the loss in reputation from delayed recalls will not be
substantial even if the brand is important to the firm. Therefore, for such brands the actual
recall costs may be seen as more significant, limiting the likelihood of an early recall. For
high reputation brands of low importance, a quick recall may not happen due to the lower
attention to the brand’s fortunes. Firms only have limited resources available to focus on
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strategic issues (Ocasio 1997). Therefore, firms will be more likely to attend to the
investigation and announce a recall when any loss in reputation has significant
consequences for their performance.
H3: Brand importance enhances the negative effect of brand reputation on time to
recall such that recalls are announced sooner for high reputation brands that
are more important.

2.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To test the hypotheses, I collected information on safety investigations initiated
by a government agency, the NHTSA, whose objective it is to assess whether automobile
products pose a safety risk to consumers. The automotive industry has been the subject of
several studies in the recall area (Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Rhee and Haunschild 2006;
Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Hartman 1987; Kalaignanam et al. 2013). It provides a great
context due to the comprehensiveness of the data available. The dataset is limited to
investigations involving single brands because including recalls with multiple brands will
not allow the use of precise measures for brand-related constructs. I collected data on all
safety investigations that were closed between 1999 and 2008 in the U.S. automotive
industry. The final dataset includes a total of 274 investigations out of which 130 ended
in a recall. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the manufacturers and the number of
investigations included in the sample. The data shows that more investigations end in a
recall when the investigation is in a later stage (58% vs. 39%).
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Data Sources and Measures
Data for the constructs in this study were collected from various sources, such as
the investigation reports issued by the NHTSA, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook,
Automotive News Market Data Book, and Consumer Reports (see Table 2.2 for an
overview). Time to recall is the time period between the opening of an investigation,
which is a public acknowledgment that there could be a potential problem, and the time
of announcement of a recall, if it happens. To measure time to recall (TIME), I collected
information on the investigation opening date and the firm’s recall announcement date.
The difference in months between these two dates measures time to recall. Both dates
were obtained from the investigation and recall reports filed by NHTSA.
Table 2.1 Overview of Manufacturers Included in Sample
Firm

Makes*

Number of
investigations

Number of
recalls

43

24

66

31

46

15

11
25
5
15
6
3
14

5
13
1
11
4
1
5

4
11
23
2
274

3
5
12
0
130

U.S.-based nameplates
Chrysler
Ford
General Motors

Chrysler, Dodge, Eagle, Plymouth,
Jeep
Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Jaguar, Land
Rover, Volvo
Buick, Chevrolet, Cadillac, GMC,
Hummer, Oldsmobile, Saab, Saturn,
Pontiac

Asia-based nameplates
Honda
Honda, Acura
Hyundai
Hyundai, Kia
Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi
Nissan
Nissan, Infiniti
Mazda
Mazda
Subaru
Subaru
Toyota
Toyota, Lexus
Europe-based nameplates
BMW
BMW
Daimler
Mercedes
VW
VW, Audi
Porsche
Porsche
TOTAL
*associated with firm between 1999 and 2008
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The information to measure the key independent variables, brand reputation,
importance, and diversification was obtained from various data sources. The measure for
brand reputation (RELIABLE) was obtained using Consumer Reports’ assessment of
vehicle quality. The quality ratings distributed by Consumer Reports greatly influence a
consumer’s perceptions of brand reliability (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Consumer
Reports surveys consumers regarding problems with a particular model and aggregates
the information into problem rates. From this data, brand reputation is measured using the
five-point scale of problem rates, with higher scores reflecting higher reputation (Rhee
2009). Scores for each brand are averaged over five years because brand reliability
reputation could be influenced by reputation from prior time periods (Rhee and
Haunschild 2006).
To measure brand importance (IMPORTANT), I calculated the proportion of the
firm’s sales in the U.S. associated with the brand of interest. A higher value indicates
greater importance of the brand to the firm’s sales performance. Brand diversification
(DIVERSE) is the variation in the range of products sold using the brand’s name. Similar
to Rhee and Haunschild (2006), I calculated the brand’s level of diversification using the
number of product lines and range of engine capacities of the models produced under the
specific brand. Principal component analysis was used to retrieve a score indicating brand
diversification. The correlation between the number of product lines and engine
capacities is .72 and the extracted component explains 87.9% of the total variance. For all
independent variables, the scores from the year corresponding to the decision to recall or
close the investigation were used.
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Table 2.2 Data Sources and Variable Operationalization
Measure
Time to recall
(TIMERECALL)

Operationalization
Monthinvestigation - Monthrecall
1

Brand reliability reputation
(RELIABLE)
(Rhee 2009)

Brand diversification
(DIVERSE)
(Rhee and Haunschild 2006)
Brand importance
(IMPORTANT)
Product harm (HARM)
Recall scope (SCOPE)
Market importance
(MARKET)

Data Sources

3

where
T is the current year
N is the number of car models
k is the car model
Ik is the overall problem score
Principal component score including
information about
• number of models
• variation in models

! "

(U.S. market)

#$%&' ()*'+,ℎ +-. )/'& '&0('1,
2#'+1/(- () /-3&,1/4+1/(-

1 = recall is geographically restricted
5+6&, (' '&3&-#&, 78. 5. $+':&1;
5+6&, (' '&3&-#&, 7<(1+6;

Investigation size
(INVSIZE)

Log(Number of vehicles under
investigation)

Firm size (SIZE)

Log(U.S. sales)

Investigation stage
(STAGE)

− NHTSA

1 = investigation ends in engineering
stage

− Consumer Reports

− Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook
− Automotive News Market
Data Book
− Consumer Reports
− Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook
− NHTSA
− NHTSA
− Annual Reports
− NHTSA
− Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook
− NHTSA

Modeling the Probability of a Recall
Before I estimate the time-to-recall model, I need to take into account that not all
investigations end in a recall. In my sample, only 130 out of the 274 investigations end in
a recall which can raise endogeneity concerns if factors that influence the recall decision
are correlated with the factors that influence time to recall. To reduce the bias in the
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estimates in the time-to-recall model, I estimate the probability of a recall and use the
inverse mills ratio (Heckman two-stage procedure; Kennedy 1998) in the time-to-recall
model. Using the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) to address for sample selection and
endogeneity problems is an approach that is commonly used in marketing (e.g., Chen et
al. 2009).
I model the firm’s decision to initiate a recall as a function of factors that reflect the
ambiguity associated with the product defect, the firm’s ability to implement a recall and
influence the firm’s motivation to avoid a product harm crisis. Factors that reduce the
ambiguity that a product defect exists are the presence of product failure reports, the
upgrading of the investigation to an engineering analysis stage, the start of the
investigation, and the level of brand diversification. The more reports of severe product
failure a firm receives, the more likely it is that the firm will announce a recall as part of
the investigation because it reduces the likelihood that the product failure is not
systematic. Also, firms will be more motivated to announce a recall for product liability
reasons. Investigations that are escalated to the engineering analysis stage should also
positively influence the probability of a recall because this escalation sends a strong
signal that NHTSA has a sufficient reason to believe that a product defect exists to
demand a thorough investigation of the problem. In addition, how the investigation was
triggered could be associated with the ambiguity of the defect. An investigation started
based on consumer complaints is associated with more ambiguity about the defect than an
investigation that is the result of a technical service bulletin or a recall that has been
previously issued by the company. Finally, brand diversification influences the
uncertainty that the firm has regarding the existence of a product defect that warrants a
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recall because the products underneath the brand are likely to differ in various
components.
In addition, the firm’s motivation and ability to initiate a recall can have an
influence on whether the investigation is likely to end in a recall. I expect that
profitability could predict the probability of an investigation ending in a recall. Even
though higher profitability increases the firm’s ability to respond, I cannot predict its
association with the probability of a recall ex ante since it may also reduce the firm’s
motivation to respond (Jayachandran and Varadarajan 2006). Firm size should generally
reduce a firm’s motivation to recall because larger firms tend to be more visible to
stakeholders and therefore receive more scrutiny. Hence, larger firms are more likely to
face the threat of a product harm crisis once they announce a recall whereas smaller firms
should be more likely to announce a recall and not get as much media coverage. A similar
argument should hold for investigation size. The larger the size of the investigated
product population, the more likely it is that a recall would be deemed newsworthy.
Moreover, the larger the investigation, the more expensive a recall becomes, thus
decreasing the firms motivation to respond. Further, I control for the firm- and yearspecific effects by including respective dummies.
The following Probit model was used to predict the conditional probability of a
recall given the set of explanatory variables listed above. To estimate this model, I used a
dataset comprising of all defect investigations that were closed between 1999 and 2008
(274 observations). Formally, for each investigation i:
(1) P(Recall = 1) =

α0 + α1DIVERSEi + α2HARMi + α3PROFITABILITYi + α4INVSIZEi
+ α5FIRMSIZEi + α6STAGEi + α7-8STARTi
+ α9-20MANUFACTURERi + α21-29YEARi + µi

36

Based on the results of this model, I estimate the IMR which is used as a covariate
in the time-to-recall model.
Modeling the Time to Recall
I choose to estimate the time-to-recall model using a Tobit model specification.
My dependent variable can take on positive values and it is likely that there are recalls
occurring soon after an investigation7. Therefore, assumptions of the ordinary least
squares regression model are likely to be violated and can therefore cause bias and
inconsistency in the estimates (Tobin 1958). Tobit models have been previously used in
duration analysis to address these concerns8 (Thomas 2001). In addition to the
relationships predicted in H1-H3, I also include several control variables to rule out
alternative explanations for variations in a firm’s recall timing behavior.
Control Variables
I first address the main effects of brand importance and brand diversification. I
expect brand importance to have a positive main effect on time to recall because, in the
event of a safety investigation, the main reason for a brand that is important to a firm to
be recalled early is the potential loss of reputation, a matter of concern only for high
reputation brands. However, in general, firms should be more motivated to delay the
recall as much as possible to wait out the investigation to maybe be able to avoid a recall
7

Note that the mean of time to recall in our sample is around 9.1 months with a standard deviation of 7.3
months.
8
An alternative estimation method for duration models is a hazard model specification. Hazard models are
used in situations when the exact time of duration is not available, for example, when observations are leftor right-censored. In our sample, we can observe the exact time to recall for all observation. Hence, we do
not have censoring because we always know the outcome of an investigation. Once an investigation is
closed it is either closed with or without a recall. Therefore, we can use limited dependent variable methods
to estimate our model. From a practical standpoint, we cannot integrate investigations that did not end in a
recall in the Time to Recall model, because some of our predictors in this model are only observed for
observations that end in a recall. Investigations without a recall would be dropped from the analysis.

37

altogether. Brand diversification, apart from moderating effect on the brand reputationtime to recall relationship, may delay recall directly because many products under the
brand may not be affected by the recall. It also decreases the firm’s motivation to expose
the brand to negative publicity but, moreover, diversification can increase the ambiguity
of the product defect that is present since the products marketed underneath the brand are
highly different from each other. Besides the main effects of brand importance and
diversification, I control for other factors that could influence a firm’s motivation to
speed up the recall. These factors are related to the ambiguity of the product defect, the
motivation to avoid negative publicity, and the likelihood that the recall will draw
publicity or is costly to implement. These control variables and the rationale for including
them in the model is presented in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Rationale behind Control Variables

Variable

Motivation to
avoid
negative
publicity

Defect
ambiguity

Brand diversification
DIVERSE

+

+

Brand importance
IMPORTANT

+

Likelihood of
crisis

Expected sign

+
+

Product harm
HARM

-

Recall scope
SCOPE

-

Market importance
MARKET

Anticipated
recall costs

+
-

-

+

+

Investigation size
INVSIZE

+

Firm size
FIRMSIZE
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+

?

+

-

In addition, firm-specific dummies were used to account for idiosyncratic factors
that may compel a firm to recall faster or slower than its competitors even when they are
faced with identical circumstances. For instance, one firm may have a culture of quick
and proactive responses compared to its rivals, resulting in faster recalls when it is faced
with a product safety concern.
I account for year-effects by entering dummy variables for the year in which the
investigation was closed (in the case of no recall) or the year of the recall announcement
to account for any factors in that particular year that might influence the timing of the
recall decision for all manufacturers. Lastly, I include the IMR estimated from the Probit
model.
Therefore, a Tobit model was employed to test the hypotheses regarding the
determinants of time to recall, where yi* denotes the latent time to recall for each
investigation i.
(2)

yi*

=

β0 + β1RELIABLEi + β2DIVERSEi + β3IMPORTANTi
+ β 4RELIABLEi*DIVERSEi + β 5RELIABLEi*IMPORTANTi
+ β6HARMi + β7SCOPEi + β8MARKETi + β9INVSIZEi
+ β10FIRMSIZEi + β11IMRi + β12-22MANUFACTURERi
+ β23-31YEARi + εi

Since the dependent variable (TIME RECALL) is censored at 0, I account for censoring
by specifying the observed time to recall as following.
(3)

yi = 0
yi = yi*

if yi* ≤ 0
if yi* > 0
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2.4 RESULTS
I first present the results for the Probit model (Probability of a recall), followed by
the results of the Tobit model (Timing of a recall). Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the
descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for the Probit and the Tobit models. All
focal variables were mean-centered before the models were estimated. I checked the
models for multicollinearity and did not find any reason for concern as variance inflation
factors were below the commonly used benchmark value of 10 (Kennedy 1998).

Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix (First Stage)
Variable

Mean

S.D.

1

1

RECALL*

2

DIV

3

HARM

4

PROFIT

5

SIZE

6

STAGE*

2

3

.47

.50

1.00

.65

1.19

-.17

1.00

1.00

3.44

.10

-.02

4

5

6

1.00

.00

.06

.13

-.08

.04

1.00

14.21

1.11

-.07

.36

.00

-.13

1.00

.45

.50

.19

.13

.00

-.05

.21

1.00

*Indicator variable, either 0 or 1

Table 2.5 Correlation Matrix (Second Stage)
Variable

Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

1

TIMERECALL

9.10

7.30

1.00

2

P(RECALL)

.57

.19

.22

1.00

3

REP

4.21

.26

-.16

-.02

1.00

4

IMP

.54

.35

-.10

-.15

.31

5

DIV

.44

1.13

.11

-.28

.05

.46

1.00

6

HARM

1.39

4.29

-.09

.27

-.05

-.08

.00

7

PROFIT

.01

.04

-.11

.10

.29

.16

.18

.02

1.00

8

RESTRICT*

.08

.27

-.01

-.09

.03

-.04

-.04

-.09

.09

1.00

9

DEALERS

.00

.00

.08

-.01

-.49

-.43

-.01

.13

-.33

-.02

*Indicator variable, either 0 or 1
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4

5

6

7

8

9

1.00
1.00

1.00

Analysis of the Probit Model: Probability of a Recall
Table 2.6 shows the results of the Probit model, which estimated the probability
of recall. The overall model was significant (LR χ2(11) = 54.66, p<.01). Product harm
(p<.05) and investigation stage (p<.01) increase the probability that a safety investigation
ends in a recall. Brand diversification is associated with a lower probability that an
investigation ends in a recall (p<.01). None of the dummies for how the investigation was
started are significant at p<.05.

Table 2.6 Impact of Firm and Investigation Characteristics on the Probability of
Recall
Model 1
Recall = 1

Dependent variable
Independent variables
DIVERSE (α1)
HARM (α2)
PROFIT (α3)
INVSIZE (α4)
FIRMSIZE (α5)
STAGE (α6)
Observations
Pseudo R2
LR χ2

-.280***
(.078)
.051**
(.026)
5.327***
(.1473)
-.073**
(.032)
-1.100
(.731)
.728***
(.206)
254
.32
54.66***

**p <.05, p<.01, Clustered standard errors, investigation
start, manufacturer and year dummies included

Firm profitability has a positive influence on recall probability (p<.01). This
finding supports the argument that highly profitable firms are in a better position to
respond to a safety investigation than those that are financially constrained. The beta
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coefficient for firm size is negative but not statistically significant (p>.10). Five firm
dummies and one year dummy are statistically significant (p<.05).
Analysis of Tobit Model: Timing of a Recall
Table 2.7 provides the results of the Tobit model (Model 1). H1 stated that
investigations end in a recall sooner when the involved brand has a high reputation. This
hypothesis is supported as the beta-coefficient for reputation is negative (β1=-10.784) and
significant at p<.05. In line with H2, I find that recall decisions are made later when a
high reliability brand is also highly diversified (β4=12.419, p<. 01). I also find evidence
for a positive main effect of brand diversification on time to recall (p<.01). According to
H3, the time to recall is shorter for high quality brands when the brand is also important
to the firm’s performance. The results support this hypothesis (β5=-42.414, p<.01). In
addition, the results show a significant, positive main effect for brand importance (p<.10),
indicating that brands are recalled later the more they contribute to the firm’s bottom line.
The results for the control variables in the Tobit model show that both firm- and
investigation-specific factors are significantly associated with time to recall. As expected,
product harm reduces time to recall (p<.01). The coefficient for recall scope is negative
and significant (p<.05). The results further suggest that recalls are initiated at a later point
in time as the importance of the U.S. market to a firm increases (p<.05). The coefficients
for investigation size and firm size are not statistically significant. Two out of eleven
firm-specific dummies and four out of nine year dummies are statistically significant at
p<.10.
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Table 2.7 Impact of Brand Reliability on Time to Recall

Model description

Model 1
Baseline model

Model 2
Log specification
of DV

Model 3
Endogeneous
reliability

Model 4
No 2-stage
Heckman

Independent variables
H1: RELIABLE ( β1)

-10.784 **
-1.254***
-12.000***
-9.390**
(4.133)
(.470)
(4.136)
(3.953)
DIVERSE ( β2)
2.355 ***
.306***
.786
1.941**
(.603)
(.075)
(.918)
(.816)
2.701 *
.260
.426
IMPORTANT ( β3)
2.394
(1.359)
(.235)
(2.166)
(2.370)
H2: RELIABLE *
12.419 ***
1.083***
5.524*
18.673***
DIVERSE (H2) ( β4)
(4.314)
(.340)
(2.952)
(5.424)
H3: RELIABLE *
-42.414 ***
-3.981***
-28.840***
-50.926***
IMPORTANT (H3) ( β5)
(15.776)
(1.486)
(10.068)
(17.534)
HARM ( β6)
-.674 ***
-.091***
-.685***
-.358***
(.175)
(.019)
(.168)
(.087)
SCOPE ( β7)
-2.498 **
-.065
-3.619**
-3.091***
(.993)
(.159)
(1.698)
(.969)
INVSIZE ( β8)
.907
.211***
.376
1.274**
(.564)
(.065)
(.505)
(.397)
MARKET ( β9)
23.397 *
1.209
31.959**
15.210*
(11.108)
(1.752)
(12.982)
(10.398)
FIRMSIZE ( β10)
-7.152
-.389
-2.478
-11.521**
(6.029)
(.692)
(4.534)
(6.200)
IMR ( β11)
-16.079 **
-2.275***
-17.087**
(6.709)
(.663)
(6.756)
Observations
114
114
112
114
Pseudo R2
.54
.65
.53
.39
87.783 ***
104.902***
83.627***
56.284***
LR χ2
*p<.10, **p <.05, p<.01, Clustered standard errors, investigation start, manufacturer and year dummies
included

Robustness Checks
I conduct several robustness checks to see whether my results are consistent with
different model specifications. First, I estimate a model using the log transformation of
time to recall as the dependent variable, which is used in duration models. The results in
Table 2.7 (Model 2) demonstrate that my results are robust to this transformation of the
dependent variable. Second, I estimate a model using an endogenized brand reputation
variable. One might argue that brand reputation is endogeneous and already determined
by the firm’s recall behavior. I therefore address these concerns by endogenizing brand
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reputation using a two-stage least squares approach (Dhar and Hoch 1997). I find support
for all of my hypotheses when using an endogenized brand reputation variable. Last, I
address the assumption of selection bias in my model. I estimate a model without
accounting for the probability of a recall. I still find support for all of my hypotheses.
However, it should be noted that some of the independent variables that are found to be
significant in the two-stage Heckman model are insignificant in the model where
selection is not modeled. Hence, even though selection bias might not directly impact the
coefficients pertaining to my hypotheses, it appears to influence other predictors in the
model.

2.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study is to address the role that brand reliability reputation has
on a firm’s recall timing decision when one or more of the brand’s products is under
investigation for a safety defect. In general, I find that brands influence time to recall
even after other investigation-, recall-, and firm-related factors are accounted for.
Specifically, I sought out to answer to key questions: Will firms announce a recall faster
when the brand under investigation has a strong reputation for being reliable? Are there
conditions under which firms will still try to delay a recall for those brands? I discuss my
findings in greater detail next.
Do Firms Recall Faster when the Brand as a High Reliability Reputation? I find
evidence that brand reputation is negatively associated with time to recall. That is, the
time until the firm notifies NHTSA of a recall is shorter as brand reputation increases.
This result shows that brand reputation motivates a firm to expedite the recall
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announcement, even though it has numerous incentives to delay a recall as much as
possible. Given that more than half of all investigations into product defects result in no
recall, firms have incentives to wait and assess the outcome of the investigation to avoid
the costs and negative publicity associated with a recall. Therefore, a firm will only make
a recall decision quickly when it believes that a quick response can mitigate the damage
from recall. For high reliability brands suspected of defects, consumers are likely to
expect proactive responses from the firm in the nature of quick recalls as part of the
implicit contract between a consumer and the brand. In this instance, should a recall be
delayed, consumers may consider the response inconsistent with their expectations for the
brand. I further find that recall happens even faster when such brands are also strong
contributors to the firm’s revenues. In this instance, the consequent downgrading of the
reputation of a brand that is critical to the firm’s performance may considerably constrain
the ability of the firm to compete in the future. In essence, when a high quality brand is
under investigation, firms risk strong reactions from the marketplace if the resulting recall
is not handled properly. Therefore, the results imply that firms are more likely to choose a
recall strategy that reduces the degree to which expectations of the brand’s behavior are
violated by initiating recalls faster when the brand has a reputation for high quality and is
significant to the firm’s revenues.
When Will Firms Delay a Recall for a Reliable Brand? My findings suggest that
firms indeed delay the recall decision for a high reputation brand under certain
circumstances. As I pointed out, there are advantages to delaying the recall and waiting
out the investigation. In line with my prediction that recalls will occur later when firms
are less concerned with the reactions of the marketplace to the recall, I find that recalls
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for a high reputation brand are less likely to be expedited when the brand is diverse. I
hypothesized that brand diversification acts as a buffer, thus reducing the extent to which
consumers react strongly to the recall, which gives the firm more leeway in their
response. To further confirm the underlying assumption that consumers are less likely to
react to a recall of a diversified brand that is investigated, I conducted a follow-up
experimental investigation using a sample of 143 undergraduate students at a major
university in the Southeast who participated in the study for partial course credit9. The
findings from this experiment show that consumers are less likely in the event of a recall
to downgrade their perceptions of a high diversity brand. Therefore, announcing a recall
at a later point in time is less risky for a firm and it will be less concerned about reacting
to the defect investigation in a manner that reduces the degree of disconfirmation that
stakeholders experience for a recall of a high reputation brand.
Theoretical Contribution
My study makes contributions to two literature streams, namely the brand
management and the recall management literature. I extend the branding literature by
examining how firms make decisions in a context where the brand is likely to face
negative publicity. The brand can be subject to negative reactions at the time of the recall
9

The study used a 2 (high diversification, low diversification) x 2 (control, recall) design. Respondents
read information about a fictitious company in the automotive industry, Omega, and answered a series of
questions regarding their perceptions about Omega. To check whether the manipulation of diversification
had the desired effect, I asked subjects to indicate whether the number of vehicles marketed by Omega was
very high (1) or very low (7) and whether Omega markets many different types of vehicles (1 = Strongly
agree, 7 = Strongly disagree). The results show that respondents perceived Omega to be less diversified in
the low diversification condition than in the high diversification condition (meanlow = 2.587 (standard error
= .093) vs. meanhigh = 2.183 (.090), F(1,139 = 9.68, p<.01). As expected, I find support for an interaction
effect between low and high portfolio diversification, control and recall condition (F(1, 136) = 5.69, p<.05).
I asked respondents about their overall impression of Omega (1 = Very positive, 7 = Very negative). The
results show that respondents downgrade their perceptions of Omega more after a recall in the low
diversification condition (meancontrol, low = 2.923 (.149) vs. meanrecall, low= 4.276 (.162)) than in the high
diversification condition (meancontrol, high = 3.113 (.148) vs. meanrecall, high= 3.731 (.156)).
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but negative sentiment can already accumulate once the defect investigation is opened
because this information is available to the public. Hence, the firm’s recall behavior is
easily observed which increases the pressures of responding in a way that reduces the risk
of damage to the brand. Interestingly, I find that firms make a risky decision and recall a
brand of high reputation relatively early into an investigation. That is, the firm is willing
to forgo the opportunity to gather more information on the product defect and actual need
of a recall to announce the recall early, which is more likely to be perceived as responsive
and in line with stakeholder expectations. Moreover, I find that even if a brand has a high
reputation, firms will make the recall timing decision depending on other brand
characteristics. Even though brand reliability reputation is strongly associated with the
recall timing decision, this relationship varies greatly with other brand characteristics. In
my case, I examine brand diversification and importance because these characteristics
may influence the expectations that managers form about the losses in the event of a
recall. Therefore, protecting a brand’s reputation is important under certain conditions.
Next, I add to the recall management literature by examining the decision-making
process leading up to the recall decision. To date, most studies have focused on
examining the post-recall process, such as communication strategies or stakeholder
reactions to the recall (Cleeren et al. 2008; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Marcus and
Goodman 1991; Rhee and Haunschild 2006). To the best of my knowledge, only three
studies have investigated timing issues with regards to product recalls (Chen et al. 2009;
Teratanavat et al. 2005; Hora et al. 2011). Teratanavat et al. (2005) examine the time it
takes meat and poultry managers to discover and respond to food safety problems. Hora
et al. (2011) investigate the time a consumer product is on the market before it is recalled.
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Even though the primary focus of Chen et al.’s study (2009) is on the stock market
reaction to different firm response strategies, the authors estimate a selection model
explaining why some firms choose a proactive (announcing a recall before market
incidents are recorded) or a reactive recall strategy (announcing a recall after-market
incidents are recorded). The research presented in this manuscript extends this sparse
literature by showing why firms choose different response strategies when facing product
investigations. Besides examining factors that influence time to recall, the findings from
this study also increases our understanding of when recalls are initiated after defect
investigations are opened. Since I focus on the time to recall, I do not advance hypotheses
regarding the drivers of the firm’s decision to announce a recall; still the results from the
Probit model demonstrate that firm’s also exhibit great variation when it comes to recall
initiation.
Managerial and Policy Implications
The findings from this study have implications for both managers and policy
makers. First, this study demonstrates that marketing has an influence on the pre-recall
decision making process. Whether and when firms should announce and implement a
recall has been mostly looked at from a product safety perspective. Clearly, it is
imperative that firms respond to significant product safety concerns and I do find
evidence that the more product failure reports a firm receives the more likely and faster it
is to announce a recall. However, even when these concerns are considered, marketingrelated assets play a role in influencing the time to recall. The findings from my study
show that brand-related concerns influence the recall timing decision when the brand has
a high reputation but only when the brand is of low diversification or high importance to
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the firm’s revenues. This behavior suggests that marketing only becomes involved in the
recall process if the recall can cause significant damage in the firm’s ability to generate
cash flows if it is managed improperly.
Further, the present study highlights the complex nature of the recall decision.
Firms are subjected to competing pulls when they determine their response to
investigation into potential product defects. They do not wish to undertake a premature
recall because of the costs, direct and indirect, involved. But they should also ensure that
the response to the investigation is consistent with stakeholder expectations, lest it leads
to downgrading of the firm’s brand assets. The decision to delay a recall has advantages
and disadvantages for the firm with respect to the direct and indirect costs. I show that the
expected losses in the brand’s reputation hasten recalls. Interestingly, I find differences in
how firms react to a reliable brand being under investigation for possible safety problems.
More importantly, I find that there is great variation in the degree to which high
reputation brands speed up the recall decision suggesting that firms take into
consideration multiple brand characteristics when making a recall timing decision.
Managers recognize that a brand’s reputation is an implicit contract with stakeholders,
and respond accordingly. The study provides guidelines to managers in terms of how
brand-related considerations influence decision-making when products are being
investigated. The results also provide guidance regarding how response to consumers
varies based on a brand’s reputation, as well as its portfolio characteristics as well as
importance to the firm. The results indicate when managers have more or less leeway in
their responses based on potential impact on the brand’s reputation.
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Moreover, the findings from my study in conjunction with findings reported by
Chen et al. (2009) suggest that firms may respond differently to product defects when the
information about the defect is public as compared to private. The authors show that
firms with a high reputation are less likely to announce a proactive recall. In contrast, my
study examines a context in which there is public information about the firm and its
responsiveness available: public investigations. From the time the investigation is
launched, stakeholders can observe the behavior of the firm. Because information about
the investigation and the responsiveness of the firm is public, firms may exhibit different
behavior to protect their brands. I complement Chen et al.’s findings by showing that,
depending on the privacy of product safety-related information, firms may respond
completely different when a high equity brand faces the threat of a recall.
Furthermore, the study has implications for policy makers. To date, research on
recall effectiveness has focused on the impact of recall on the return of defective products
and the reduction of product-associated injuries and accidents. Since recalls are a means
to reduce product harm, recalls could be interpreted as more effective when initiated early
in order to reduce the number of anticipated safety failures. The longer the recall is
delayed, the more likely it is that the product causes additional injuries, increasing costs
to the firm and society. I discuss how firms do not always have incentives to initiate a
recall fast. Even though I find that firms react more quickly to investigations when the
product failure incidents are severe, they are less responsive when they are unlikely to
face negative consequences influencing their brand-related assets and performance. To
overcome this resistance, policy makers can, for instance, try to put more pressure on
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firms by communicating their activities related to safety investigations with greater
clarity.
Limitations and Future Directions
While the manuscript provides interesting insights into product recalls, the fact
that the study is industry-specific might limit the generalizability of the results. The
automotive industry is characterized by a higher frequency of recalls compared to other
industries. Therefore, firms may face the challenge of managing multiple recalls in such
industries, which might not be true of other industries. Still, focusing on a single industry
allows for better control given the heterogeneity in products and safety expectations if
multiple industries were to be included in the data. Perhaps because of this, studies on
product recalls tend to focus on a single rather than multiple industries (e.g., Rhee and
Haunschild 2006; Van Heerde et al. 2007; Hora et al. 2011; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011;
Thomsen and McKenzie 2001). Thus, my approach is consistent with prior research into
product recalls in this regard. The legal and other aspects that drive product
investigations have substantial industry-specific idiosyncrasy that clear empirical
assessments are potentially possible only using within-industry samples. Furthermore, it
is important to note that the automotive industry is a highly relevant industry from an
economic perspective, representing 4% of the GDP in the U.S. (Mergent 2011).
Regardless, one avenue for future research is to investigate firms’ recall behavior in other
industries to assess the generalizability of the results.
Furthermore, the reliance on secondary data limits the research to a context for
which information about the time to recall and other variables of interest is available. The
arguments are based on the notion that time to recall varies with the anticipated losses in
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a brand’s reputation and firm performance. The use of secondary data, unfortunately,
does not allow us to obtain such process evidence. I conducted an experiment to examine
how brand diversification may influence the extent to consumers downgrade their
perceptions. The results support the argument that diversification may be able to shield
high quality brands from negative news. However, a wider assessment of the process that
underlies consumer and other stakeholder responses to product investigations through
survey and experimental research will provide rich insights.
Future research may be able to address the stock market valuation of different
recall timing strategies. Since the stock market incorporates the recalled brand’s ability to
generate cash flows for the firm, addressing how the different brand characteristics
examined in this study influence the reaction of shareholders to government-influenced
recalls could provide additional insights into whether firms are able to maintain the
reputation of the brand.
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CHAPTER 3
WHEN DO BRANDS HELP OR HURT A FIRM’S EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT AN
EFFECTIVE RECALL?
Product recalls to address the problem of defective products are a fairly frequent
occurrence. Recalls are expected to remedy the safety and performance problems likely
to arise from defective products. In response to the recall announcement, consumers are
expected to return the product for repair, replacement, or refund. However, despite the
importance of responding to recalls, consumers often do not comply. A recent inquiry by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) into auto safety revealed that recall
completion rates vary substantially, ranging from as low as 20-30% to over 90%. The
problem of low compliance rates is not restricted to the automotive industry. Recalls of
consumer products such as toys, furniture or appliances face similar problems10. Low
recall compliance is not merely because consumers are unaware of the recall or they
decide to just get rid of the defective product. A recent study by Consumer Reports finds
that a third of consumers that are aware of owning a recalled product do not respond to
the recall nor stop using the product (Consumer Reports 2011). Non-compliance to
recalls has significant consequences for consumer safety. Harm to consumers from
continued use of recalled products could damage the reputation of firms due to the
negative publicity and salience of such information even though the firm may have
undertaken a recall.

10

http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/101932/recalleffectiveness.pdf
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The question is: why would consumers not comply with a recall and seek the
remedy provided by the manufacturer? It could merely be that they do not consider it
worth their while to seek the remedy offered by the recall – the product might be too
inexpensive or the consequence of the product defect may not be perceived as serious
enough. Apart from these reasons, the characteristics of the product may influence
consumer decision to participate in the recall. In this study, I investigate one such
characteristic - the role of brands as a key antecedent of consumer motivation to comply
with product recall. Brands play a dominant role in the consumer’s purchase decision and
marketers spend substantial resources to create and maintain strong brands. Yet, it is
unclear whether these investments help or hurt firms and policy makers that are trying to
get consumers to respond to a recall. The studies on recall effectiveness, to date, do not
consider the potential impact of brands on a consumer’s motivation to comply with a
recall (Hoffer at al. 1994; Laufer and Jung 2010; Murphy and Rubin 1988; Rupp and
Taylor 2002). Research on recall effectiveness has largely examined the firm’s ability to
learn from a recall (Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Kalaignanam et al. 2013; Thirumalai and
Sinha 2011). Efforts to examine consumer compliance with recall have been rare,
especially from a strong theoretical perspective.
Findings from the brand management literature do not give clear indications on
whether brand strength will enhance or diminish consumer response to recalls. Studies
find that the influence of brand strength on consumer response to negative information, as
reflected in a recall announcement, is complex. Negative information regarding strong
brands might invoke a strong response due to expectancy violation or a weak effect due
to buffering (Aaker et al. 2004; Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000), resulting
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in higher or lower compliance to recalls. Given the uncertainty, the research questions
that I address are:
1. Do brands influence the likelihood that consumers comply with a
recall request?
2. Under what conditions do brands increase or decrease recall
compliance?
The theoretical underpinnings for this study come from the branding literature,
specifically the stream of research focusing on brands and negative publicity. Brands face
negative publicity during product failures, recalls and withdrawals. In general, negative
information is highly diagnostic; it is perceived to be more credible than positive
information and usually receives more weight in the consumer decision-making process
(Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991; Skowronski and Carlston 1987). Hence, negative
information can be damaging to brands if consumers update their brand beliefs. However,
brands can have an effect on the way in which consumers and other stakeholders process
information. Particularly brands can influence the attention and distortion of negative
information (e.g., Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Using the argument underlying motivated
reasoning, brands can influence whether consumers want to come to a particularly
desired or a correct conclusion (Kunda 1990) regarding the negative information.
Employing these theoretical ideas, my research makes several contributions to
theory and practice. First, this study contributes to the branding literature. This study
examines conditions under which brands can help the firm increase recall effectiveness.
Given that brand equity is a multi-dimensional construct (Keller 1993; 2003), I examine
multiple brand dimensions and how they relate to recall compliance. Second, I contribute
to the recall effectiveness literature by examining the role of marketing assets on recall
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compliance. The impact of brands on different aspects of recall effectiveness is relatively
unexplored even though their role on post-crisis brand evaluations and firm performance
has received a lot of attention.
Third, this study contributes to the literature on product warnings, which focuses
on the effective communication of dangers associated with product consumption. This
literature includes studies on injurious product consumption, warning labels, and safety
instructions (Andrews, Netemeyer, and Durvasula 1991; Celuch, Lust, and Showers
1998; Griffin et al. 1991; Patterson, Hunnicutt, and Stutts 1992; Pechmann et al. 2003).
While I examine when brands increase or decrease compliance, I also investigate how
policy makers and managers can shape communication to enhance compliance. Lastly,
this study increases our general understanding of how consumers respond to a recall.
I hypothesize that consumers are generally more likely to comply with a recall
when the recalled brand has a high quality reputation, but that this relationship varies
depending on the strength of the consumer-brand relationship. Study 1A examines these
hypotheses using a unique secondary data set of 359 recalls from the automotive industry.
The results show that the compliance rate for recalls increase with the brand’s reputation
for quality, but this result does not hold for consumers who are very loyal. These findings
are supported using an experimental study (Study 1B). Lastly, in Study 2, I address how
managers and policy makers can overcome the dampening effect of the consumer-brand
relationship on recall compliance.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I review the current
literature on consumer reactions to brands when negative information is present, and the
implications of those findings for recall compliance. Given the characteristics of the
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recall context, I argue that consumer compliance with a recall depends on whether they
attend to and distort the recall information (Figure 3.1). I then advance hypotheses and
test them in Studies 1 and 2. I than discuss my findings and their implications for theory
and practice.

Brand-related
antecedents

Processing recall
information

Brand quality

Attention

Behavioral outcomes

Compliance
Consumer-brand
relationship

Distortion

Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework (Essay 2)

3.1 BACKGROUND: BRANDS AND RECALL COMPLIANCE
Recall compliance refers to consumers following the instructions of
manufacturers as stated in a recall announcement, and seeking out the remedy that is
provided. Remedies typically are repairs, returns, and refunds. Compliance can be
influenced by a variety of factors, such as product and threat characteristics (Hoffer et al.
1994; Murphy and Rubin 1988; Rupp and Taylor 2002). Ensuring recall compliance
should be important to firms for a variety of reasons. Even though one may argue that
firms benefit from low compliance because it reduces the costs of repairing or replacing
the recalled product, low compliance is undesirable for several reasons. If firms fail to
retrieve and remedy recalled products, those products can still pose a threat to consumers
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and their property. In case of a failure, it is likely that consumers will blame the firm for
the failure (Folkes 1984). In addition, the accumulation of product failures can have an
adverse impact on the firm’s reputation and it may be blamed for an ineffective recall
effort. Moreover, recalls are supervised by government agencies such as the FDA, CPSC
or NHTSA who monitor recall effectiveness. If recall compliance is poor, these agencies
can request a recall to be re-announced, which would result in additional negative
publicity. Also, firms have to report the progress of the recall to these agencies for a
longer time period, tying up resources in product recall management. Thus, there are
many reasons why firms ought to be concerned with recall compliance.
A variety of factors influence whether consumers comply with a recall. Prior
research has dealt with how threat and product characteristics influence recall
compliance. I propose that brand characteristics can also explain some of the variation in
consumer compliance behavior. The branding literature shows that brands can alter the
way in which consumers’ process negative information, such as information about a
product recall. Specifically, studies have shown that consumers might react more or less
strongly to a recall for strong brands - brands that have high equity in the minds of the
consumers (Keller 1993).
Brands influence whether consumers pay attention to recall information. Brands
set expectations in the marketplace. Brands can act as a signal for unobservable quality
(Rao, Qu, and Ruekert 1999) and can reduce the risk consumers’ associate with a
purchase (Erdem and Swait 1998). A recall, however, contrasts with the expectations that
consumers might have if the brand is of high quality. It informs consumers that a product
that they currently own can fail and harm them or their property. Consumers tend to be
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sensitive to information that conflicts with their expectations (Heath and Chatterjee 1995;
Dawar and Pillutla 2000) and negative information, such as information about a recall,
tends to be highly credible and diagnostic (Skowronski and Carlston 1987; Herr et al.
1991). If consumers feel like they were let down by a brand’s actions that are inconsistent
with its promise, they will blame the brand for the failure (Folkes 1984). Moreover, under
these circumstances, consumers will expect the firm to provide restitution for the broken
promise (Folkes 1984). Hence, a recall provides information that a brand falls short of the
expectations that consumers have, and this expectancy violation should motivate them to
comply with the recall.
But brands also influence whether consumers distort negative information that
conflicts with their prior attitudes toward the brand. Consumers may rely more heavily on
their positive attitudes when faced with negative brand-related information, which
alleviates the negativity effect (Ahluwalia 2002). As negative information becomes less
salient, consumers may not experience disconfirmation to the same degree, as do
consumers who process the recall information without counter-arguing its seriousness.
Since the level of disconfirmation influences the motivation of a consumer to respond to
a recall, their level of compliance to a recall should also vary depending on whether they
will process the recall information without downplaying its gravity.
In short, brands influence how consumers process information, which has
consequences for their motivation to comply with a recall. Depending on the brand that is
involved in the recall, consumers may be more or less likely to return a recalled product.
In the following section, I advance hypotheses regarding the influence of brand quality on
recall compliance.
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3.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The reputation that a brand has for its quality sets expectations in the marketplace.
More specifically, the higher a brand’s quality reputation, the higher the expectations that
consumers have about the brand’s performance. Consumers do not expect such a brand to
fail and if information about potential failures, such as a recall, becomes available, their
expectations about the product are disconfirmed. In contrast, if consumers receive a recall
notification for a low quality brand, their expectations are not disconfirmed to the same
degree as they would be more a high quality brand.
A recall for a high quality brand violates the implicit norms in the relationship
between the brand and the consumer. Aaker and colleagues (2004) suggest in their study
on brand transgressions that consumers may feel betrayed by such a transgression,
thinking that “this is not the brand I thought it was” (p. 13). Consumers are thus more
likely to pay attention to the recall because it contrasts with their expectations of high
quality. Moreover, consumers do not expect the brand to fail and they may be more likely
to subsequently blame the manufacturer for the failure (Griffin et al. 1996; Folkes 1984).
As a result, they expect to be compensated for the faulty product (Kelley and Davis
1994). In essence, consumers should be more likely to seek out the remedy when the
brand has a high quality reputation than when it has a low quality reputation.
However, the extent to which consumers experience disconfirmation may vary
depending on their relationship with the brand. There are instances in which consumers
are less responsive to a recall, even if the recall provides information that violates their
strongly held assumptions about the brand’s performance. Prior research has shown that
consumer-brand relationship can influence the way in which consumers process
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information that is inconsistent with prior attitudes. Specifically, consumers who have
strong attitudes towards a brand are more likely to fall back on their positive attitudes
when receiving negative information about the brand (Ahluwalia 2002). Consumers
therefore effectively counterargue information that contrasts with their attitudes
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000) and as a consequence consumers are able to resist negative
information even when it contradicts a central promise made by the brand (Pullig et al.
2006). This means that even if a recall targets a high quality brand, consumers are able to
bias this information in such a manner that they do not experience a high degree of
disconfirmation. This is particularly likely if the information is seen as not too negative
(Einwiller et al. 2006; Liu, Wang, and Wu 2010). Given that there is a possibility that a
recalled product might or might not fail, consumers can discount the recall information
because there is a chance that the product that they own works properly, especially if they
have strong attachment to the brand. Brand characteristics that enable the distorting of
negative information are reflected in different dimensions of the consumer-brand
relationship, such as familiarity, identification, commitment, or attachment (Einwiller et
al. 2006; Liu, Wang, and Wu 2010; Schmalz and Orth 2012; Brady et al. 2008).
Therefore, I expect that consumers will be less likely to react to a recall of a high quality
brand if they have a strong relationship (and strong prior attitudes) with the brand
because their expectations of the brand’s performance are disconfirmed to a lesser degree
than if they have a weak relationship with the brand.
H1: The higher the quality reputation of the recalled brand, the more likely it is that
consumers comply with a product recall.
H2: The association between brand quality reputation and recall compliance will be
weaker as the strength of the consumer-brand relationship increases.
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3.3 STUDY 1A: BRANDS AND RECALL COMPLIANCE - AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY
Sample and Data Sources
The purpose of Study 1A is to test H1 and H2 using real-world data from the
automotive industry. Automotive industry serves as an effective context to test the
hypotheses for a variety of reasons. Using the automotive industry as my sampling frame
allows us to collect detailed information about the return rates after a recall. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the agency overseeing the initiation
and completion of recalls for vehicles, tires, and vehicle-related equipment, publishes
information on the effectiveness of a recall. In accordance with Federal Regulation 573.6,
firms that initiate a recall have to provide quarterly progress reports for at least six
quarters, starting with the quarter in which vehicle owners were notified of the recall.
These quarterly progress reports include information about the recalled product
population, the number of products remedied, and the number of consumers that could
not be reached. The NHTSA may require the manufacturer to extend the reporting period
if the percentage of product returned after the recall initiation is deemed insufficient.
Apart from data availability, the focus on the automobile industry also enhances the
internal validity of my findings.
For reasons of data availability, I limit the sample to vehicle recalls of major
automakers from January 2006 to March 2010. Since I am interested in the impact of
product quality on recall compliance, I restrict the data to recalls that include only one
brand to separate out the brand effect. Furthermore, recalls are excluded if they are label
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recalls11, involve a remedy at the consumer-level, or include medium- and heavy-duty
trucks, motorcycles, or commercial vehicles. Recalls are also excluded if they target
fewer than 1000 units, since manufacturers may pursue different notification strategies
for smaller recalls (i.e., calling consumers) that could alter return behavior in general,
whereas these notification strategies would not be feasible for larger recalls. In total, 359
recalls are included in the final sample.
Dependent Variable: Recall compliance
An overview of the variables used in this study, their operationalization, and data
sources can be found in Table 1. Recall compliance was measured using return rate,
collected from the quarterly progress report that each manufacturer submits to the
NHTSA to monitor recall progress. The return rate is measured at the end of the sixth
quarter after recall information is disseminated to consumers by the firm via recall
notification letters. The quarter in which the firm sends out notification letters to
consumers is the first out of six quarters for which it has to report information about
product returns. If the recall notification was sent out in January of any given year, the
first progress report would be due the end of the first quarter (March) in that year. Hence,
the return rate reflects the proportion of recalled products returned and repaired
approximately 1.5 years after vehicle owners were notified of the recall. The measure
used in this study adjusts for the number of products for which notifications could not be
delivered to consumers.

11

Label recalls are recalls where parts of the product are incorrectly labeled, such as tires or information in
manuals. Manufacturers can remedy this product error by sending out new labels or new manuals to
consumers with the recall notification. Consumers can install these labels themselves and therefore it is not
possible to track recall effectiveness through compiling information about product returns to dealerships.
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Independent Variables
Brand quality reputation (BQR) was measured with data from Consumer Reports
using a method outlined by Rhee and Haunschild (2006) and Rhee (2009). Brand quality
reputation can range from 0 to 5 with higher scores indicating higher perceptions of
quality. The consumer-brand relationship strength (C-B Relationship) was measured
using brand loyalty. The more loyal consumers are, the more likely it is that they have a
strong relationship with the brand. A measure for brand loyalty was obtained from a
survey conducted by J.D. Power Associates on customer retention. This annual survey
indicates how many consumers of a specific brand decided to purchase a vehicle of the
same brand when considering a new car. The resulting measure, therefore, is the
percentage of consumers that decide to purchase a car of the same brand that they
currently own.
I control for several factors that are likely to influence a consumer’s return
behavior. Whether a recall was publicized using consumer-centric publications could
influence the level of compliance. To capture this, I include a dummy that indicates
whether the product recall was published in Consumer Reports. I also include a dummy
to signify whether the recalled brand is targeted towards the luxury segment or the mass
market. Consumers may purchase luxury brands for their symbolic value and information
about a product defect may decrease the perceived value of product. Thus, these
consumers may be more motivated to return a vehicle soon after the recall notification to
maintain the product’s value. In addition, prior studies on recall effectiveness have shown
that recalls including inaugural models are more effective and ones including older
models are less effective. Not only does it get increasingly difficult for firms to contact
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consumers but also the relationship that consumers have with the product gets stronger as
they accumulate experience with the product. Hence, a recall may not motivate a
consumer who has had years of positive product experiences to return the product fast. I
include a dummy variable for inaugural models and one for 4+ year-old models included
in the recall. These two variables may not be mutually exclusive since the product
population included in recalls may span multiple years.
I control for repair time since the length of the time period that the consumer has
to allocate for repair should impact their motivation to seek out a remedy fast.
Specifically, I expect that the longer the repair takes the less motivated the consumer is to
return the product because it is inconvenient for a consumer to remain without a car for a
long time-period. I collected information about the length of the repair process from the
owner notification letters sent out by a manufacturer. If a time range is listed, I use the
maximum repair time stated in the letter. If a manufacturer stated that a repair would take
half a day, I assumed that the consumer would remain without a car for four hours.
The dataset includes observations from various automakers in the U.S. market.
Due to the fact that there are multiple observations for each firm, I use dummies for other
firm-specific factors that might influence recall compliance. I also control for types of
components involved in the recall to account for different perceptions of threat severity.
Finally, I control for year effects in the final model.
Model
Since the product return rate reflects the percentage of products that have been
returned and repaired, the non-normal distribution of the dependent variable is likely to
violate assumptions of the ordinary least squares regression model. Therefore, I estimate
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a generalized linear model using maximum likelihood for each recall i that can account
for the distribution of the dependent variable with the logit link (Papke and Wooldridge
1996, Table 3.1). The model is estimated using cluster-robust standard errors.
Table 3.1 Regression Model for Recall Compliance
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Variable
Recall
compliance
BQ Reputation
C-B Relationship
Control
variables
Publicity
Inaugural model
4+ year old
model
Luxury brand
Repair time

Operationalization
Number of vehicles repaired/(Recall
population-Unavailable vehicles)
Brand quality rating on a scaled of 1-5 (Rhee
2009; Rhee and Haunschild 2006)
Percentage of consumers replacing vehicle
with a vehicle of the same brand
Operationalization

Data source
Quarterly Progress
Reports
Consumer Reports
J.D. Power Associates

Data source

1 if recall was publicized in Consumer
Reports
1 if recall involves an inaugural model, 0
otherwise
1 if recall involves a model at least 4 years old
at the time of the recall, 0 otherwise
1 if vehicle is marketed in the luxury segment,
0 otherwise
Log(Time needed for the repair (in minutes))

Consumer Reports
NHTSA
NHTSA
J.D. Power Associates
Notification letter

Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics

Mean

S.D.

(1)

(1)

Recall compliance

.77

.18

1.00

(3)

(4)

(2)

BQ Reputation

4.21

.34

-.25

1.00

(3)
(4)

C-B Relationship
Publicity

.44
.09

.12
.29

-.15
-.11

.33
.07

1.00
.09

1.00

(5)

Inaugural

.67

.47

.38

.07

.02

-.19

1.00

(6)
(7)

4+ Years
Luxury

.23
.30

.42
.46

-.45
.31

-.04
-.42

-.01
-.12

.14
-.15

(8)

Repair Time

91.40

80.05

-.03

.18

.26

.12
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(2)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-.61
-.07

1.00
.07

1.00

-.16

.12

.01

(8)

1.00

Results
The summary statistics and correlation matrix can be found in Table 3.2. Since
some variables show relatively high intercorrelation, I mean-center all continuous
variables to reduce issues with multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (Table
3.3) for both the reduced and the full model are below commonly used benchmarks
indicating that multicollinearity is of little concern when interpreting the results of the
GLM model.
In H1, I hypothesized that brand quality has a positive association with recall
compliance. In line with this hypothesis, I find evidence that brand quality is positively
associated with product return rates (p<.05). H2 posits that the relationship between
brand quality and compliance is weaker as the strength of the consumer-brand
relationship increases. The beta-coefficient for the interaction effect between brand
quality and loyalty is negative and signification (p<.05) in support of H2. I further find
evidence for a strong main effect of brand loyalty (negative, p<.01) on return rates.
Control variables. Regarding the influence of publicity, the results show that
recalls that were announced in Consumer Reports have a higher completion rate than
those that were not (p<.05). The results further show that product age has a significant
impact on the return and repair rate of recalled products. As expected, recalls involving
newer (older) models are associated with higher (lower) return rates respectively (p<.01).
The coefficient for the dummy indicating a luxury brand is in the expected direction
(positive) and significant (p<.01). The coefficient for repair time is opposite to my
expectations but insignificant. Finally, I find that 8 out of 17 firm dummies are significant
which suggests that there is variation between firms with regards to the return rates they
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achieve six quarters after initiating a recall. Also, 8 out of 19 component dummies and 2
out of 5 year dummies are significant.
Table 3.3 Brand Quality, Loyalty, and Recall Compliance
DV = Recall Compliance
BQ Reputation
C-B Relationship
BQ Reputation*C-B Relationship
Publicity
Inaugural Model
4+Years Model

Coeff.

S.E.

.914 **

.536

-1.224 ***
-2.744 **

.515
1.336

.233 **

.133

.479 ***
-.941 ***

.094
.126

Luxury Brand

.746 **

.345

Repair Time
Constant

.000
1.151 ***

.001
.400

Firm Dummies
Year Dummies

8 out of 17 significant
2 out of 5 significant

Component Dummies

8 out of 19 significant

Log pseudolikelihood
BIC

-96.804
-1330.45

Observations

288

Highest VIF
1.56
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed tests, standard errors adjusted
for firm clusters.

Discussion
The automotive study supports my hypotheses that brand characteristics influence
consumer compliance with a recall. Specifically, I find evidence that compliance is
greater for high quality brands but only if consumers are not too strongly attached to the
brand. This study demonstrates the external validity of the impact of brands on consumer
compliance. To test the internal validity of the results, I use an experimental study.
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3.4 STUDY 1B: BRANDS AND RECALL COMPLIANCE - EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY
A total of 152 undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the
experiment from an introductory marketing class at a large public university in the
Southeast. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for their participation.
Design. To test H1 and H2, I implemented a 2 (brand quality: high and moderate)
x 2 (commitment of consumer toward the target brand: present and control) betweensubjects design. In this study, I focus on commitment of the consumer to the brand as a
reflection of the strength of the consumer-brand relationship. Even though the strength of
consumer-brand relationship is reflected in many variables, a public commitment to the
brand indicates that consumers are willing to signal to others that they have chosen this
particular brand over others. Recall compliance was measured by asking respondents the
likelihood with which they would return the recalled product to the manufacturer (7-point
Likert scale, anchors: Strongly disagree – Strongly agree).
Brand quality manipulation. To manipulate brand quality, consumers received
additional background information about the focal product, including ratings of the
product’s performance and examples of consumer reviews (Figure 3.2). In the high
quality condition, participants were told that the product received a rating of 4.5 out of 5
stars from consumers (Figure 3.3). Two reviews indicated that consumers thought that the
product was of good quality and that they loved using it. In the moderate quality
conditions, participants were told that the product was rated 2.5 out of 5 stars. The
reviews indicated that consumers were unsure of the quality of the product and did not
expect the product to last very long (refer to Appendix A for the full survey).
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LUMINIX “Powermat” Wireless Charger

Product details
•

A simple, fast and efficient way to keep all of your personal electronic devices
charged

•

Portable Powermat folds up for easy travel

•

Four charging positions--three wireless, and one wired USB connector for
charging a fourth device

•

Individual tone and light controls; auto power-off for each device when charging
is complete

Figure 3.2 Product Description

Consumer-brand relationship strength manipulation. To manipulate the strength of the
consumer-brand relationship, I focused on the commitment of the consumer to the brand.
Brand commitment is one dimension that reflects the strength of the consumer-brand
relationship (Fournier 1998). In Study 1A, the strength of the consumer-brand
relationship was measured using a behavioral loyalty measure. Brand commitment, in
contrast, reflects attitudinal loyalty to the brand and has been shown to influence the use
of proattitudinal arguments when negative information targets the brand (Ahluwalia et al.
2000).
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Product Reviews
According to online reviews, consumers gave the Powermat the following rating:

“I LOVE my Powermat. My parents got me one for Christmas and it is so easy to use.
Now I can charge my iPod, iPad and Nintendo at the same time!!! Very sturdy,
dropped it once already and it still works perfectly.”
“I use the Powermat every day. I travel a lot and it’s super convenient. It seems to be of
good quality, I have not yet had any problems with the charger. Thumbs up!”

Figure 3.3 Brand Quality Manipulation (High Quality Example)

The brand commitment manipulation was adapted from prior research (Ahluwalia
et al. 2000) to fit the context of this study. In the brand commitment condition, consumers
were asked to rate the product and come up with a slogan that the manufacturer could use
for their promotional materials. Consumers then filled in a release form to allow Luminix
to use their rating and slogan for promotional purposes. Hence, consumers made a public
commitment to the brand by allowing the company to freely use their ratings and slogans.
In the control condition, consumers did not receive the brand commitment manipulation.
They rated the product, but they did not create a slogan or fill out the release form.
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LUMINIX would like to use a statement from you in their promotional materials
for their product launch in South Carolina.
Please write down a slogan that you would suggest LUMINIX use to market
their product in South Carolina

Release Form
I hereby release the statements or the slogans above, that I am voluntarily submitting, to
LUMINIX to use it as they see fit, for their promotional materials.

I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE TO THE POLICIES AS STATED ABOVE.

Figure 3.4 Brand Commitment Manipulation

Procedure. Consumers received background information about a fictitious
company called Luminix that produces wireless charging systems among other products.
The product category was chosen because the product (charger) is expensive enough for
consumers to be motivated to return the recalled product rather than discard it. Also, it is
a newer product category where many small companies operate, which reduces the
likelihood that respondents are very familiar with the brands in this product category.
Respondents were told that Luminix was planning on selling their product line of
wireless chargers nationwide. Respondents then received either the high or moderate
quality manipulation, followed by the public commitment manipulation. Thereafter, they
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answered questions about the product’s quality, and were subsequently given the target
stimulus, the recall notification. After they read the recall notification, respondents were
asked whether they would be likely to return the product to the manufacturer. They also
provided responses to demographic questions.
Results
After cleaning the data, which included removing respondents that 1) did not
complete the entire experiment 2) did not sign the release waiver 3) failed manipulation
checks and could not correctly remember the type of product that was used in the study or
4) whose responses constituted extreme observations (based on assumptions of a normal
distribution), I ended up with a final sample of 137 respondents (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Final Sample Study 1B

Initial sample
- Failed manipulation checks
- Unsigned waivers
- Removed outliers
- Incomplete observations
FINAL SAMPLE

152
2
6
1
6
137

Brand quality manipulation. Respondents answered four questions about the
quality of the Luminix brand to check the success of the quality manipulation (please
refer to Appendix A). The one-way ANOVA for brand quality is significant (F (1, 136) =
40.94, p<.01), indicating that the quality manipulation was successful. Respondents rated
Luminix higher in the high quality condition (M=5.07) than in the moderate quality
condition (M=4.14).
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NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Communications
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 21, 2011
Release #12-063

Washington, D.C.
Firm’s Recall Hotline: (877) 856-3232
CPSC Recall Hotline: (800) 638-2772
CPSC Media Contact: (301) 504-7908

LUMINIX Recalls Wireless Charger Mat Due to Explosion Hazard
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, in cooperation with
LUMINIX, today announced a voluntary recall of the following consumer product. Consumers
should stop using recalled products immediately unless otherwise instructed. It is illegal to resell
or attempt to resell a recalled consumer product.
prod
Name of Product: LUMINIX “Powermat” Wireless Charger
Units: About 20,000
Manufacturer: LUMINIX Inc, of Seattle, WA
Hazard: The charger mat contains a defect which can cause overheating, posing a fire hazard.
Incidents/Injuries: LUMINIX has received
received three reports of smoke and one report of fire.
LUMINIX-branded
branded charger mat part of the LUMINIX
Description: This recall involves the LUMINIX
“Powermat” Wireless Charger system. LUMINIX and a part number beginning with “CTL” are
printed in white lettering on tthe product.
Sold exclusively at: Retail stores in WA, OR, CA, NV, and AZ and online at www.luminix.com
between February 2011 and October 2011 for about $50.
Remedy: Consumers should immediately stop using the charger mat. Consumers can contact
LUMINIX for instructions on how to return the product for a repair.
Customer contact: For more information, contact LUMINIX toll
toll-free
free at (877) 856-3232
856
between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. CT Monday through Friday, or visit the firm’s website at
www.luminix.com

Figure 3.5 Recall Notification Manipulation
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Recall compliance. The two-way ANOVA for return likelihood, with gender as a
covariate, is significant (F (4, 136) = 2.41, p=.05). Gender was included since prior
research on health-related communication has shown strong gender effects (Keller and
Lehmann 2008). I do not find evidence of main effects for either brand quality or public
commitment, but their interaction is significant (F (1, 136) = 3.38, p=.07, Figure 3.6).
Contrasts show that in the control condition, where respondents did not receive the
commitment manipulation, return likelihood is higher in the high quality than in the low
quality condition (Mhigh, control = 5.57 vs. Mlow, control = 4.70, p=.05). This finding supports
H1 that, in general, consumers are more likely to comply with a recall and return the
product when the recalled brand is of high quality. However, when respondents
completed the commitment manipulation, their likelihood of returning the recalled
product in the high quality condition dropped significantly (Mhigh, commit = 4.55 vs. Mhigh,
control =5.57

, p=.06). This finding supports H2, which posits that consumers are more

likely to respond to a recall of a high quality brand when they have a weak relationship
with the brand compared to a strong relationship. Also, the results support a significant
main effect for the covariate gender (F (1, 136) = 3.57, p=.06) in that females are more
likely to return the recalled product than male respondents.
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Figure 3.6 Brand Quality, Commitment and Return Likelihood

Discussion Studies 1A and 1B
The findings from Study 1A and 1B support the hypothesis that consumers are
more likely to comply with a recall when the quality reputation of the recalled brand is
high, but this propensity declines when they are loyal to the brand. Thus, the brand has an
influence on how consumers respond to a recall.
I hypothesized that the reason why consumers are less likely to comply with the
recall of a high quality brand with which they have a strong relationship is because they
resist negative information (e.g., Ahluwalia et al. 2000). It should be feasible to mitigate
the insulating effect of brand relationship if the recall information is more salient, and it
becomes difficult for consumers to dismiss this information. One way to do so would be
to increase the relevance of the recall information to consumers, thereby reducing the
likelihood that they will downplay the seriousness of the recall notification. Selfreferencing makes information more relevant to consumers and has been shown to
increase memory and recall (Symons and Johnson 1997; Burnkrant and Unnava 1989).
As the relevance of the recall information increases, it should become more difficult for
consumers to effectively counterargue the negative information. In contrast, if the recall
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information does not specifically reference the consumer, they might resist it more easily
and come up with more counterarguments. Consequently, this processing of recall
information in conditions where the recall information is not self-referenced should result
in lower compliance. Therefore, I expect that
H3: For high quality brands, self-referencing of the recall information increases
compliance to a recall when consumers have a strong relationship with the recalled brand
(compared to other-referencing or no referencing).

3.5 STUDY 2: MODERATING EFFECT OF SELF-REFERENCING
A total of 185 undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the
experiment from an introductory marketing class at a large public university in the
Southeast. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for their participation.
Design. The design of Study 2 was a 2 (commitment of consumer toward the
target brand: present and control) x 3 (type of referencing: self-referencing, otherreferencing, and no referencing) between-subjects design. Recall compliance was
measured the same way as the consumer’s likelihood to return the recalled product. The
brand commitment manipulation was identical to the one in Study 1B.
Type of referencing manipulation. I varied the recall information such that the
product hazard could occur to the respondent directly (self-referencing) or to others
(other-referencing). These manipulations are in line with those used in other studies
(Burnkrant and Unnava 1989; Keller and Block 1996). The “no referencing” condition
did not specify whether the hazard could occur to the consumer or others, similar to the
recall notification used in Study 1B (refer to Appendix B for the full survey).
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Procedure. Study 2 used the same company and background information as Study
1B for the high brand quality condition. After reading the background information,
respondents then either completed the brand commitment manipulation or proceeded with
the study without completing it. After the brand commitment manipulation, respondents
answered whether they would be likely to purchase the product once it becomes
available. Respondents then received the recall notification in which the type of
referencing manipulation was embedded. After they read the recall notification,
respondents were asked whether they would be likely to return the product to the
manufacturer as well as a few demographic questions.
Results
The data was cleaned using the same procedures as in Study 1B. The final sample
included 153 observations (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5 Final Sample Study 2
Initial sample
- Failed manipulation checks
- Unsigned waivers
- Removed outliers
- Incomplete observations
FINAL SAMPLE

185
3
3
10
16
153

Brand commitment manipulation. A one-way ANOVA with gender as a covariate
reveals that the manipulation of public commitment has a significant impact on whether
consumers are likely to purchase the product (F(2, 152) = 4.92, p<.01). The main effects
for commitment (F (1, 152) =3.41, p=.07) and the covariate gender (F(1, 152) =6.27,
p<.05) are significant. Specifically, participants in the high commitment condition are
more likely to purchase the product once it becomes available (Mhigh = 4.93) compared to
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participants in the low commitment condition (Mlow = 4.41). Also female respondents are
more likely to purchase the product than male respondents.
Recall compliance. The two-way ANOVA for return likelihood with gender as a
covariate is significant (F (6, 152) = 5.44, p<.01). The main effect of type of referencing
is statistically significant (F (2, 152) = 5.80, p<.01). Respondents are more likely to
return the product in the self-referencing than in the other-referencing and no referencing
conditions (Mself = 5.97 vs. Mother = 4.72 vs. Mnoref = 5.20, p<.05). Further, the interaction
between commitment and type of referencing is significant (F (2, 152) = 7.80, p<.01,
Figure 3.7). As predicted in H3, consumers in the public commitment condition are more
likely to respond to the recall notification when the information is self-referenced (Mhigh,
self =

6.65) compared to when it is other-referenced (Mhigh, other = 4.22) or not referenced

(Mhigh, noref = 4.52, p<.01). Also, self-referencing is more effective when consumers have
a strong relationship with the brand than when they do not (p<.05), whereas otherreferencing and no referencing increase compliance when consumers do not have a strong
relationship with the brand (both p<.05). This finding of a consumer’s differential
response to a recall depending on the strength of their relationship with the recalled brand
replicates the results from the high quality condition in Study 1B.
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Figure 3.7 Commitment, Type of Referencing and Return Likelihood

3.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The objective of this study is to investigate the role of brands in the recall return
process. Given that previous literature finds that brands could potentially increase or
decrease consumer response to a recall, I investigated following research questions:
Do brands influence the likelihood that consumers comply with a recall request and
under which conditions do brands increase or decrease recall compliance?
In this manuscript, I demonstrate how brands influence the likelihood that
consumers comply with a recall notification. The focus of this study is on high quality
brands and conditions under which consumers’ respond to recalls of these brands. In
Studies 1A and 1B, I find that, in general, high quality brands increase recall compliance
but that the strength of this association differs depending on whether consumers have a
strong relationship with the brand. Specifically, a stronger consumer-brand relationship
reduces the likelihood that consumers would comply with a recall for a high quality
brand.
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Whether a strong brand relationship leads to discounting of the recall message
depends on how the consequences of the product defect are communicated. The findings
from Study 2 suggest that making the recall notification relevant to the consumer through
self-referencing can attenuate the “buffering” effect of a strong consumer-brand
relationship. This finding is in line with findings from previous literature that brands are
less likely to lead to biased information processing if consumers have a reason to arrive at
a correct rather than a desired conclusion (Ahluwalia 2002).
Theoretical Contributions
This study makes several theoretical contributions. The first contribution is to the
branding literature. Given the conflicting findings as to whether strong brands hurt or
help the recall process, I demonstrate that one has to consider brand-related information
processing biases to understand how consumers respond to negative information about a
brand that is conveyed by recall announcements. There are certain brand characteristics
that increase attention to negative information. I show that brand quality increases the
likelihood that consumers will attend to negative information involving a product recall
because it is inconsistent with prior expectations. Although attention to negative
information is a prerequisite for a strong reaction, consumers still can bias the negative
information even if they attend to it. Certain brand dimensions can increase the likelihood
that consumers place less weight on negative information and engage in defensive
information processing. I show that the strength of the consumer-brand relationship gives
consumers incentives to discount negative information. Hence, different brand
dimensions can have different influences on how consumers process negative information
which, taken together, might be able to reconcile the conflicting findings as some studies
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only examine the brand expectations and others only examine consumer-brand
relationships.
The manuscript demonstrates how important it is to consider brands when
investigating recall effectiveness. Brands can influence compliance beyond other product
characteristics and threat characteristics. Even though researchers have examined
differences in recall response behavior (Hoffer et al. 1994; Murphy and Rubin 1988;
Rupp and Taylor 2002), they did not focus on the type of brand that is being recalled
even though brands play a central role in consumption decisions. Moreover, I show that
the effectiveness of different health communication strategies can be influenced by
brands. Prior research has shown that other-referencing is influential when
communicating health protective behavior (Keller and Block 1996; Keller and Lehmann
2008; Pechmann et al. 2003), but I find that when brands are taken into consideration,
self-referencing should be preferred over other-referencing.
Managerial and Policy Implications
The finding that brands influence how consumers respond to product recalls has
several implications for managers and policy makers. The most important implication for
both managers and policy makers is that one has to take into account the brand of the
recalled product when developing a strategy for recall implementation. To date, the focus
of studies on recall compliance has been on tangible product and threat characteristics.
Particularly in the health communication literature, researchers and policy makers are
concerned with how to better communicate the threat of a recalled product to consumers,
not taking into consideration that brands also influence how consumers respond to a
recall. One reason why the role of brands may be understudied in this context is because
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consumers may not be able to voice that they respond differently to recalls based on the
brands involved. The GAO conducted focus groups into what motivates consumers to
respond to recall notifications and according to their results consumers want to be able to
better understand the severity of the defect and the convenience of getting the remedy
(Albright 2011). They may not be aware that the recalled brand and their relationship
with the brand influence their response. Nevertheless, the investments that marketing
strategy makes into building and maintaining strong brands influence consumers’
motivation to the product recall as well.
Specifically, I find evidence that brands can help firms implement an effective
recall. Studies 1A and 1B show that brand quality reputation is positively associated with
recall return rates. Hence, brand quality can help in increasing recall effectiveness.
Researchers have provided some evidence that awareness of a recall is higher and the
media is more likely to report recalls of high quality brands (Dawar and Pillutla 2000;
Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Consumers in the automotive industry should generally be
aware of a recall because firms have access to owner records and send out personalized
recall notifications, so my results could suggest differences in whether consumers attend
to this information. The positive association between brand quality and recall return rates
is in line with my assumption that consumers are more likely to attend to information that
conflicts with their prior expectations. However, this association is contingent on the
brand-consumer relationship.
Achieving a certain level of compliance is further relevant from a recall
management perspective. The progress of a recall is monitored by the government agency
responsible for the product category. In the case of the auto industry, the NHTSA can

83

require that firms re-announce a recall to increase compliance. If the NHTSA determines
that recall compliance is too low, a firm not only has to send out additional notifications
but also has to report the progress of the recall beyond the mandated six quarters.
According to a 2011 GAO report, the minimum completion requirement after six
reporting quarters is 65%. If the firm at this point has remedied less than this proportion
of vehicles, then the NHTSA can recommend that the firm send out additional recall
notifications. Post-hoc, I analyzed the proportion of recalls involving a high quality brand
that either reached or failed to reach this minimum requirement. If consumers of the high
quality brand are very loyal, 36% of recalls do not reach the 65% completion rate
compared to 11% of recalls when consumers are less loyal (Figure 3.8). Therefore, the
strength of the consumer-brand relationship has significant implications on the extent to
which recalls may be subject to supervision by a governmental agency in the long run.

100%

% of recalls

75%
Reach

50%

Not Reach
25%
0%
Low Loyalty

High Loyalty

Figure 3.8 Proportion of Recalls of High Quality Brands Reaching Minimum Recall
Completion Rates after 18 Months

Managing the product return process is important not only from the perspective of
complying with the requirements of a regulatory agency. Research on product and service
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failure shows that a well-managed recovery process is key to ensuring continued
customer satisfaction and repeated patronage (Maxham and Netemeyer 2002). Given that
some of the consumers of such brands do not readily respond to recall notification, it
becomes increasingly likely that the recalled product will fail as consumers continue to
use it. As the number of product failures stack up, it becomes increasingly likely that this
information is incorporated in the brand evaluations of not only current but also
prospective consumers. High quality brands with highly loyal consumers, paradoxically,
could risk losing their value proposition as it becomes more difficult for them to remove
the product and remedy the defect. Moreover, consumers of high quality products also
have higher expectations regarding the resolution of a product failure (Kelley and Davis
1994), and may also be more likely to blame the company when the product is deemed
unreliable, especially if they do not have a strong relationship with the brand.
Since a high quality brand can theoretically help a company gain recall
compliance, it is important to understand how firms might be able to break through the
buffer of the consumer-brand relationship. In Study 2, I examined how different types of
referencing can influence compliance with a recall. The findings suggest that the
buffering effect of a strong brand relationship is attenuated when the recall notification
highlights that the product can cause damage to the consumer directly. The buffering
effect is present, however, if the product is listed as causing damage to others. Hence,
managers should stress the risk that the product presents to the consumer when
announcing a recall, at least for consumers with a strong relationship with the brand.
However, given that health communication literature generally points out that otherreferencing is more effective than self-referencing when communicating threats to
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consumers (e.g., Keller and Lehmann 2008), further research should investigate the
conditions under which brands increase the effectiveness of self-referenced messages.
Keller and Block (1996) find that self-referencing can result in defensive information
processing when fear appeals are used. Other-referencing reduces defensive information
processing which results in a greater likelihood that consumers will respond to the
message. One explanation of why I do not find evidence that self-referencing is less
effective than other-referencing is that the recall notification may not be considered as a
fear appeal even when it is self-referenced. A post-hoc analysis of the data used in Study
2 reveals that there are no differences in reported fear across the six conditions. The
overall mean for perceived fear is 3.18 on a 7-point Likert scale where higher values
indicated higher levels of perceived fear. Hence, the levels of fear are fairly low, which
supports the argument that a recall notification should not be considered a fear appeal
when brands are present. I cannot say whether or not the same would hold when no
information about the recalled brand is given, but since recall notifications always
include product and brand information, this scenario – even though interesting – is not
practical.
This study also has important implications for policy makers. Policy makers are
extremely concerned with improving recall effectiveness. In 2011, the GAO inquired into
recall effectiveness in the automotive industry. In addition, for consumer products, the
CPSC has compiled information on how to improve consumer response to recalls.
Besides the three identified studies on product return rates, there is a large body of
research on the effectiveness of product warnings and labels. I show that policy makers
need to factor in the brand of the recalled product in addition to warning and consumer
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characteristics. Managers spend a lot of effort in building up strong brands that influence
how consumers process brand-related information. Brands can help in increasing
compliance because they can increase the awareness of a recall (Dawar and Pillutla
2000). Increased awareness is particularly important in industries in which individualized
recall notifications are currently not possible because consumers cannot be identified. In
the context of Study 1, I make the assumption that consumers are aware of the recall
because they received a personalized recall letter from the company. The findings from
this study suggest that consumers are more attentive to this information if the recall is for
a high quality brand than if it is for a low quality brand. The positive association of the
high quality brand with recall compliance, however, is attenuated by the strength of the
consumer-brand relationship.
Policy makers have to be aware of the strong, negative effect of loyalty since it
biases the way consumers process information. Not only does a strong consumer-brand
relationship erode the advantage that a high quality brand has in increasing compliance
rates, it also has a negative main effect on compliance. Hence, policy interventions do
have to take into consideration that recalled products are branded because brands
influence consumer behavior. In addition, Study 2 shows that the buffering effect of a
brand is exacerbated when a communication strategy is utilized that highlights that the
product defect can pose a threat to others. Even though this strategy has been found to be
effective – and I also find that it is for consumers not committed to a brand – it
strengthens the buffering effect for high commitment consumers because it allows them
to engage in defensive processing.
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It is not always the case that consumers that receive a recall notification are also
the users of this product. Toys, furniture, or household items are examples of product
categories where more than just one person is using the product and the user of the
product may not be the one receiving the notification (e.g., parent receives recall
notification for a toy that children play with). This shared product experience may make
it more likely that consumers perceive themselves to be invulnerable to the defect. Given
the findings of this present research, policy makers might benefit from clearly outlining
how the product does not only impact others but also the consumer directly to improve
compliance.
Limitations and Future Studies
The present studies have some limitations that could be addressed in future
studies. First, the experiments rely on manipulations of the consumer-brand relationship
whereas I am able to measure the consumer-brand relationship in the field study. Since I
use a fictitious brand, consumers do not have a previously established relationship with
the brand. Therefore, I cannot measure the strength of the consumer-brand relationship in
the same manner across all studies. Moreover, given the use of scenarios, participants in
the experiments have not had any actual experience with the recalled product. Even
though I still find different reactions to recalls depending on brand quality and
commitment, future research can utilize real brands in experiments to test consumer
reactions to product recalls. Given that the consumer-brand relationship is a
multidimensional construct (Fournier 1998), additional research can examine other brand
relationship dimensions beyond those tested in the field study and the experiments that
can impact consumer response to negative information.
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Second, future studies can address specifically how consumers cope with
receiving a recall notification depending on the recalled brand. In the field study, I
observe whether consumers return a recalled product to the manufacturer for a repair and
I try to control for as many alternative explanations as possible. However, I am unable to
observe exactly how consumers cope with receiving recall notifications. While
consumers do bias the negative information about the product recall for high quality
brands that they are committed to, it could be the case that they do not even open recall
notifications for such brands or discard them immediately afterwards. Qualitative
research could provide some additional insights into how consumers deal with recall
information in their home.
Third, additional research can examine the process through which brand quality
and the consumer-brand relationship influences return likelihood. There are multiple
explanations as to why consumers might be motivated to comply with a recall. The
product/service failure literature would suggest that consumers return the recalled product
because they experience a state of dissonance when they receive information about a
product recall for a high quality brand. Alternatively, consumers can feel let down by the
brand and comply with the recall in order to achieve justice for the potentially defective
brand. Moreover, consumers could be motivated to return the recalled product because
they feel that the product poses a threat to themselves and others. Hence, there are
different reasons that can motivate consumers to return a recalled product and future
studies can investigate which process best explains their responses to a product recall.
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APPENDIX A - SURVEY STUDY 1B (ESSAY 2)
Consumer Survey
General Instructions
We are interested in your opinion about a product that is already available for sale in
some parts of the United States and may also be available nationwide in the future. We
are interested in your first impression of this product even though you haven't had an
opportunity to try it yet. There are no right or wrong answers; we just want your opinion.
Company Background
LUMINIX is a medium-sized, privately owned company with headquarters in Seattle,
WA. Recently, the company has introduced a series of charging systems for cell phones
and other hand-held devices, such as the iPad, Kindle, or Nintendo DS, in states in the
western United States. Now, the company is considering expanding to locations
nationwide, including South Carolina.
Product Description
LUMINIX Powermat Wireless Charger

98

Product Details

-

A simple, fast and efficient way to keep all of your personal electronic devices
charged
Portable powermat folds up for easy travel
Four charging positions - three wireless, ad one wired USB connector for charging a
fourth device
Individual tone and light controls; auto power-off for each device when charging is
complete

[High quality condition]
Product Reviews
According to online reviews, consumers gave the Powermat the following rating:

“I LOVE my Powermat. My parents got me one for Christmas and it is so easy to use.
Now I can charge my iPod, iPad and Nintendo at the same time!!! Very sturdy, dropped
it once already and it still works perfectly.”
“I use the Powermat every day. I travel a lot and it’s super convenient. It seems to be of
good quality, I have not yet had any problems with the charger. Thumbs up!”
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[Moderate quality condition]
Product Reviews
According to online reviews, consumers gave the Powermat the following rating:

“My parents got me one for Christmas and it is very easy to use but I’m not quite sure
about the quality. The plast
plastic
ic seems to be of low quality and you can see every scratch.
Already dropped it once so hopefully it continues to work.”
“I use the Powermat every day. I travel a lot and it’s convenient but I don’t expect the
charger to last for another 3 months.”
Please indicate your perceptions of LUMINIX’s brand.
Good

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

Beneficial

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Harmful

Desirable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Undesirable

Nice

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Awful

100

[High commitment condition]
Please write down a slogan that you would suggest LUMINIX use to market their product
in South Carolina

Release Form
I hereby release the statements or the slogans above, that I am voluntarily submitting, to
LUMINIX to use it as they see fit, for their promotional materials.

I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE TO THE POLICIES AS STATED ABOVE.

I agree
I disagree

LUMINIX offers high
quality products.
LUMINIX is a strong,
reliable company.
LUMINIX stands
behind the product that
it offers.
LUMINIX develops
innovative products.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
disagree
nor agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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The following questions refer to the remedy that the company provides for the recalled
product.
Please keep this information in mind when answering the next questions.
If my LUMINIX charger is among those involved in the recall, I would...
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
disagree
nor agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

… stop using the recalled
charging mat.
… return the recalled
charging mat to
LUMINIX for a repair.
… replace the recalled
charging mat with
another product.
… discard the recalled
charging mat.

When you read the previous press release about the product recall, to what extent did
you feel
Fearful
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Nervous

Scared

Nauseated

Uncomfortable
Not at all
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Which product does LUMINIX sell?
MP3 players
Cell phones
Laptops
Cell phone chargers
I don’t know/remember

Please answer the following questions about yourself.
How knowledgeable are you about cell phones?
Not knowledgeable at
1
2
3
4
5
all

6

7

Very knowledgeable

How familiar are you with cell phones?
Not familiar at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very familiar

3

4

5

6

7

Daily

How often do you use cell phones?
Never

1

2

How knowledgeable are you about cell phone chargers?
Not knowledgeable at
all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very knowledgeable

4

5

6

7

Very familiar

4

5

6

7

Daily

How familiar are you with cell phone chargers?
Not familiar at all

1

2

3

How often do you use cell phone chargers?
Never

1

2

3

Your gender:

____ Male

Ethnicity:

_____________

Age:

____ years

Primary language:

_____________

___ Female

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.
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APPENDIX B - SURVEY STUDY 2 (ESSAY 2)
Consumer Survey
General Instructions
We are interested in your opinion about a product that is already available for sale in
some parts of the United States and may also be available nationwide in the future. We
are interested in your first impression of this product even though you haven't had an
opportunity to try it yet. There are no right or wrong answers; we just want your opinion.
Company Background
LUMINIX is a medium-sized, privately owned company with headquarters in Seattle,
WA. Recently, the company has introduced a series of charging systems for cell phones
and other hand-held devices, such as the iPad, Kindle, or Nintendo DS, in states in the
western United States. Now, the company is considering expanding to locations
nationwide, including South Carolina.
Product Description
LUMINIX Powermat Wireless Charger
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Product Details

-

A simple, fast and efficient way to keep all of your personal electronic devices
charged
Portable powermat folds up for easy travel
Four charging positions - three wireless, ad one wired USB connector for charging a
fourth device
Individual tone and light controls; auto power-off for each device when charging is
complete

Product Reviews
According to online reviews, consumers gave the Powermat the following rating:

“I LOVE my Powermat. My parents got me one for Christmas and it is so easy to use.
Now I can charge my iPod, iPad and Nintendo at the same time!!! Very sturdy, dropped
it once already and it still works perfectly.”
“I use the Powermat every day. I travel a lot and it’s super convenient. It seems to be of
good quality, I have not yet had any problems with the charger. Thumbs up!”
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Please indicate your perceptions of LUMINIX’s brand.
Good

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

Beneficial

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Harmful

Desirable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Undesirable

Nice

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Awful

[High commitment condition]
Please write down a slogan that you would suggest LUMINIX use to market their product
in South Carolina

Release Form
I hereby release the statements or the slogans above, that I am voluntarily submitting, to
LUMINIX to use it as they see fit, for their promotional materials.

I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE TO THE POLICIES AS STATED ABOVE.

I agree
I disagree
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I would purchase a
LUMINIX charger if it
becomes available.

LUMINIX offers high
quality products.
LUMINIX is a strong,
reliable company.
LUMINIX stands
behind the product that
it offers.
LUMINIX develops
innovative products.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
disagree
nor agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
disagree
nor agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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[Other-referencing condition]
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[Self-referencing condition]

110

[No referencing condition]
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The following questions refer to the remedy that the company provides for the recalled
product.
Please keep this information in mind when answering the next questions.
If my LUMINIX charger is among those involved in the recall, I would...
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
disagree
nor agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

… stop using the recalled
charging mat.
… return the recalled
charging mat to
LUMINIX for a repair.
… replace the recalled
charging mat with
another product.
… discard the recalled
charging mat.

When you read the previous press release about the product recall, to what extent did
you feel
Fearful
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

Nervous

Scared

Nauseated

Uncomfortable
Not at all

Which product does LUMINIX sell?
MP3 players
Cell phones
Laptops
Cell phone chargers
I don’t know/remember
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Please answer the following questions about yourself.
How knowledgeable are you about cell phones?
Not knowledgeable at
all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very knowledgeable

3

4

5

6

7

Very familiar

3

4

5

6

7

Daily

How familiar are you with cell phones?
Not familiar at all

1

2

How often do you use cell phones?
Never

1

2

How knowledgeable are you about cell phone chargers?
Not knowledgeable at
all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very knowledgeable

4

5

6

7

Very familiar

4

5

6

7

Daily

How familiar are you with cell phone chargers?
Not familiar at all

1

2

3

How often do you use cell phone chargers?
Never

1

2

3

Your gender:

____ Male

Ethnicity:

_____________

Age:

____ years

Primary language:

_____________

___ Female

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.

113

